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21 NOVEMBER 1986

# **SPECIAL TRANSLATION**

USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Press Briefing

7, 21, 24, 31 JULY, 19 AUGUST, 11 SEPTEMBER 1986

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MFA PRESS BRIEFING ON GORBACHEV, MITTERRAND DINNER REMARKS

[The following is the text of a press briefing held subsequent to dinner addresses by M. S. Gorbachev and Francois Mitterand on 7 July 1986 during the latter's visit to Moscow. The briefing opens with commentary by Gennadiy Ivanovich Gerasimov, chief of the MFA Information Department, and is conducted in Russian except where noted.]

[Text] [Gerasimov] Ladies and gentlemen, comrades. First of all a short personal note in connection with the fact that I am serving in my present capacity for the first time; this is my sixth day as chief of the Information Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Therefore you and I [words indistinct] participants in the meeting. [Sentence indistinct]

As you are aware, today was the first day of the Soviet-French summit meeting. The day opened with a meeting between Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and Francois Mitterand, president of the French Republic. This meeting was held behind closed doors, and it was agreed that another such meeting will be held [word indistinct] tomorrow as well. In the opinion of the Soviet interlocutor this was a very important meeting: it was the continuation of the political dialogue begun last year in Paris, a dialogue on the major aspects of the world situation. It was underscored that the world situation remains tense. One can even note some changes for the worse, and that once again underscores the need for detente, detente which is favored by both the Soviet Union and France. The exchange of opinions will continue in this vein. Today the main point in the topics which were brought up was mainly questions pertaining to... in addition to discussion by the Soviet side of its internal tasks, of the course we are pursuing in the wake of the 27th Party Congress, a course aimed at [words indistinct] of our entire country... mainly the two sides focused their attention on the most difficult peace issues, in particular disarmament. As I have stated, this exchange of opinions will continue. I can also note that, in the opinion of President Mitterand, an opinion with which Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev is in agreement, these meetings are significant in and of themselves, but they should also yield concrete results; this desire was expressed by the French side and seconded by the Soviet side. In general one can say that currently there is occurring a deepening of the Franco-Soviet political dialogue; in an atmosphere of openness the two sides are clarifying their positions on the issue of disarmament.

The Soviet side expressed its confidence that there are possibilities here for a change for the better, and that there are opportunities here for Franco-Soviet cooperation. As I have already said, both participants found the conversation interesting and and rich in content. The discussion took place in atmosphere of frankness and striving for mutual understanding, with an understanding of the great responsibility... in an atmosphere of the great responsibility for the security of Europe and for international security and for a good state of Franco-Soviet relations which rests upon the leaders of our two countries.

As for the dinner speeches which you have just heard, you, of course, [words indistinct], and I can only add some explanatory remarks in response to your questions.

That is all I have to say; your questions, please.

[David Angelman, CBS NEWS correspondent -- in English] Can you tell us, sir, whether President Mitterand briefed the General Secretary...

[Gerasimov -- in English] Sorry?

[Angelman -- in English] Can you tell us whether President Mitterand briefed the General Secretary on his discussions with President Reagan in New York, or whether there was any discussion at all about the possibility of a Reagan-Gorbachev summit meeting?

[Gerasimov] There is a possibility that this will be discussed.

[CZECHOSLOVAKIAN TELEGRAPH AGENCY correspondent] During the dinner both representatives came out in favor of a successful return to [words indistinct]. Obviously there is common ground on this point. Were any specific forms of cooperation discussed or outlined in the course of the talks?

[Gerasimov] It is still too early to reply to this question, as the talks have just begun; only the first meeting has taken place. But, generally speaking, I can say that the opportunity for Soviet-French cooperation in several specific aspects of tension reduction and arms limitation was underscored. And one of these directions is [words indistinct].

[Dutch correspondent, name indistinct -- in English] Mikhail Sergeyevich said in his speech that the Soviet Union is ready to be inspired in practice by the contents of the project for a final declaration in Bern in its relations, in its bilateral relations with other states. Could you explain to us what this means in practice?

[Gerasimov] In Bern [words indistinct] a document which was not adopted due to an unexpectedly negative reaction by the American delegation. Nevertheless... nevertheless the Soviet Union has unilaterally begun work in accordance with the draft plans which were not adopted in Bern, and we appeal to other nations to join with us in doing so. And we are prepared to conduct negotiations toward this end.

[Martin Walker, GUARDIAN correspondent -- in English] President Mitterand said in his speech that there were some issues upon which the views had diverged and some upon which they had converged. Can you tell us anything more about where the views did diverge and on what particular issues?

[Gerasimov] The talks were of a closed nature, and therefore I can only reply to your question in general terms. Of course the Soviet Union and France have differences of opinion on all [word indistinct] issues. But there is also a great atmosphere of convergence of opinions in principle as to their interests. For example, as far as I recall there was talk of the future of Europe and peace in Europe, from the standpoint of what contribution the Soviet Union and France could make to preserving peace in Europe, particularly if they were to combine their efforts. We would like to emphasize that in the field of disarmament and disarmament initiatives, the Soviet Union and France, aware of their responsibility as European powers for peace not only on our own continent, can find [words indistinct] cooperation.

[Shriver, CANADIAN BROADCASTING correspondent -- in English] You said in your opening remarks that... that sentence was a little unclear... you wanted a frank discussion on disarmament, and that the Soviet view here is that there is a possibility that matters will take a turn to the better. Am I correct in understanding that, is that accurate? And if so, what are the areas of possibility seen by the leaders for a turn to the better?

[Gerasimov -- in English] Possibilities of dealing with the matter of what?

[Shriver -- in English] As I understand it from the translation you were referring to disarmament in Europe.

[Gerasimov] I can say that at today's meeting the main topic of discussion, the main topic, as I have already said, was that of peace, how to preserve peace, and disarmament. I also said that, if they wish, the Soviet Union and France can find opportunities for specific joint steps. For example at the Geneva Disarmament Conference or at other international forums. We are convinced that if the requisite will exists this sort of joint actions is a possibility.

[Michael Dobbs, WASHINGTON POST correspondent -- in English] When Mr. Gorbachev came to Paris last year he used the opportunity of his visit to France to make a major new arms proposal in public. Is there likely to be any similar move this time, now that Mr. Mitterand is here?

[Gerasimov] You have just heard the address by our leader. The fact of the matter is that there are already quite a few interesting and important Soviet peace initiatives, and it is not for the West to ask us for new initiatives, but it is rather time for it to consider a statement affirming the serious significance of the Soviet initiatives, and to give a purely businesslike [?] and practical reply to them.

[Bolshakov, PRAVDA correspondent] Tell us: you mentioned the "mutual desire of the Soviet and French sides to reach a concrete agreement." What did you

mean by that? Will a joint communique be issued, or joint documents about specific cooperation [words indistinct]?

[Gerasimov] Basically, I think we will have to wait and see how the negotiations proceed from here. But, as you heard, the French President spoke of the possibility of economic cooperation, [words indistinct] its problems, about the possibility of cultural cooperation, cooperation in the scientific field. Incidentally, this will be the topic of discussion at the next day of talks. Today's topic was, speaking thematically, the topic of disarmament. In that area as well, as I have already said, the Soviet Union and France can find opportunities for joint actions. Well, for example, I could give the example of our positions on the time frame of [word indistinct] for obtaining [words indistinct] issues; in this area it is possible to speak of common positions. And other specific examples, especially [words indistinct] when the talks have just begun.

[Pierre (name indistinct), L'EXPRESS correspondent, Paris -- in French] In his speech Mr. Gorbachev spoke of international humanitarian cooperation, envisioning practical [words indistinct]; [sentence indistinct].

[Gerasimov] Firstly, as I have already said, today's discussion did not deal with this sort of issue; it pertained only to issues of peace and disarmament. As for [Gorbachev's] dinner speech, as you already know, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev said that we are prepared to comply unilaterally with the draft plans which, through the fault of the United States, of the American delegation, were not adopted, although agreement had already been reached [words indistinct] and were joined by [word indistinct] delegation. [Words indistinct] as to that perhaps we will learn more specific details sometime in the future. [Pause] Are there any further questions?

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## GERASIMOV SPEAKS AT MFA PRESS BRIEFING ON INTERNATIONAL ISSUES

Moscow MFA Press Briefing in Russian 21 Jul 86

[Press briefing by Gennadiy Gerasimov at Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Center on 21 July 1986. The briefing was conducted in Russian except where noted]

[Text] [Gerasimov] ....Soviet-West German talks. Our guest, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany Hans-Dietrich Genscher, had a meeting with Soviet leader Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. The meeting was a long one, lasting three hours. Genscher delivered Comrade Gorbachev an oral message from Chancellor Kohl. Well, what can I say of this meeting. It was lively, frank and constructive. I can also say that the talks covered a very wide range of questions pertaining to the international situation, the situation in Europe, and to questions of bilateral relations. One could probably say that special, priority attention was given to Europe, the European aspect of international security. In particular, the importance of our countries' efforts to ensure conditions of peace, security and cooperation in Europe, our common home, was noted. They also spoke of the contribution our countries could make to the solution of problems of European security, which is also important for the world as a whole. They noted the paramount significance of the Moscow treaty, as well as the Helsinki process. These documents are addressed not to the past, they should be regarded as documents addressed to the future, as bricks for building the future, the future peaceful Europe. They should be actively used to promote cooperation in all directions. As for bilateral relations, questions of cooperation in all fields were discussed: the economic field, for example, including discussion of possible new forms of economic cooperation, cooperation in the sphere of science and culture. They dealt in detail with problems of disarmament, and it could, perhaps, be emphasized here, from the point of view of the contribution which the Federal Republic of Germany could make to this matter, but so far has not manifested itself actively. The talks are continuing, as you know. That's all I have on Mr. Genscher's visit.

True, I could add such a point, that [words indistinct] commentaries that the active Soviet diplomacy--as you know, there was the visit of our minister of foreign affairs to England, before that we had a visit from the President of France, other visits and meetings are planned, currently Genscher is visiting with us--that all this is explained by the fact that we, the Soviet Union,



allegedly need some kind of breather in order to pull up the economy, in order to resolve our domestic economic problems of socio-economic development, which are inhibited by the arms race. I can agree that the arms race, of course, interferes with our plans, at least our plans of economic development, insofar as it diverts resources from creative aims. However, I don't think it would be correct to say that this diplomacy of ours is due to the fact that we are in need of some sort of breather. It is our principled policy. We in general suggest that everybody stop to reflect what nuclear weapons can bring to the world. This is not a question of expediency, as the statement about a breather would seem to suggest. It is a question of adopting a new mindset, because nuclear weapons threaten us all with death, the we won't be concerned with economic development of either our or any other country. Therefore I would like to stress that this active diplomacy of ours is our principled policy, not a question of expediency.

The next topic I would like to inform and tell you of is that on 22 July an extraordinary session of the Standing Consultative Commission is opening. It was set up to facilitate implementation of the objectives and provisions of the anti-ballistic missile treaty. It was set up, secondly, to assure compliance with the accords in the field of strategic arms limitations, and it was set up, thirdly, to monitor compliance with the treaty on measures to reduce the threat of nuclear war between the Soviet Union and the United States. It is very good that this session has been called. It has been called on Soviet initiative, but the American side agreed with our proposal to hold this session. The idea is that on our, the Soviet side, questions will be raised which we consider serious, pertaining to the political and strategic consequences of the American Administration's decision, taken May 27, to withdraw from the 1972 Interim Agreement on Certain Measures in the Field of Strategic Offensive Arms Limitations and from the 1979 Treaty on Strategic Offensive Weapons Limitations, that is, SALT-1 and SALT-2. As we see it, this represents a dismantling of commitments, of accords restraining the arms race, commitments and accords which were reached not just like that, but as a result of many years of joint efforts of the Soviet Union and the United States. We consider that all the positive achievements in the sphere of nuclear arms reductions should be preserved. Therefore continued compliance of both parties with the SALT-2 treaty would contribute to greater security and the preservation of the global alignment of forces. At this point we see absolutely no rational germ in the deterrence regime concept which the American side suggests instead.

Next item. On 25 July Soviet-American bilateral diplomatic, we could call them contacts concerning nuclear explosions, well, we could call them negotiations, will start. As is known, the Soviet Union favors a total ban on nuclear tests. We are currently not conducting nuclear tests, and we invite the United States to follow this example. We have agreed, you will recall, last week we agreed that American scientists could come to us and set up instruments, seismic instruments, or seismographic, I don't know how to call them exactly, seismographs not far from Soviet test sites so as to verify nuclear tests. You even know that these instruments recorded not Soviet nuclear explosions--there are none--they recorded the 14th American nuclear explosion, counting from the time the unilateral Soviet moratorium was announced. It is very interesting that, in general, this is rather a

challenge, this nuclear explosion, to world public opinion, but nevertheless, this event, which one could call out of the ordinary, as I read in today's PRAVDA a report from the paper's correspondent in the United States that this explosion wasn't even reported, neither in the NEW YORK TIMES, with its slogan on the first page, "All the news that's fit to print," nor in any other American newspaper. This gives rise to the sad thought that American newspapers, the American media have evidently grown used to the fact that the earth under their feet shakes from American explosions, so that one more American nuclear explosion isn't regarded as news. We, in any case, consider that nuclear explosions should be ended, and to do this we need to work out some accord which would ban such tests in the international legal aspect. At one time, as you know, there were talks on this subject, and now we have repeatedly suggested getting back to work on such an accord. In March, for example, the Soviet Union offered the United States to start bilateral talks on this question. We even named the head of the Soviet delegation to these talks, namely, Comrade Petrosyants, Chairman of the State Committee for Utilization of Atomic Energy. Up till now The United States has sought to reduce the question of nuclear tests to verification of nuclear explosions. I must say that now, too, information is coming from the United States to the effect that the future talks due to start on the 25th will concentrate on ways of verifying the yield of explosions, in particular, so that the United States would ratify two partial test ban treaties concluded on this subject, one the so-called threshold treaty, on banning explosions above 150 kilotons, and the other treaty on peaceful nuclear explosions. Well, so I would like to say that in the course of bilateral diplomatic contacts we were able to reach agreement that the parties would hold talks of experts, in Geneva, on the whole range of questions, that is, verification as well as determination of ways of complete renunciation of nuclear tests. That is the current agenda of this meeting of experts. This formula takes into account the positions of both parties and orients the talks towards achieving an effective agreement on ending and banning all nuclear tests. The Soviet delegation will be headed by Comrade Petrosyants.

Next item. Our relations with African countries are developing. Mussa Traore, General Secretary of the Democratic Alliance of the Mali People, President of the Republic of Mali, made an official friendly visit to the Soviet Union. There was a visit by a Nigerian government delegation headed by member of the ruling Armed Forces Council of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Chief of the General Staff ( Fedi Tuhutile ). Relations with African countries have been and remain an important aspect of our foreign policy activity. We see these countries, the peoples liberated from colonialism, we see them as friends, equal partners in the struggle for the cause of peace and progress, and we are in solidarity with their desire to consolidate their sovereignty and uphold their freedom and independence. On 18 July, Comrade Gorbachev had a talk with Comrade Traore in a warm and friendly atmosphere. A report on this was published, as well as information about the talks and two documents: a Declaration on Further Development of Relations of Friendship and Cooperation between the USSR and Mali, and a joint Soviet-Mali communique. Cooperation agreements were signed between our parties, and inter-governmental documents on questions of continued bilateral economic and technical cooperation.

The visit of the Nigerian delegation showed that the future of Soviet-Nigerian relations can also be viewed with optimism. In the course of this visit attention was concentrated mainly on questions of economic and technical cooperation between our countries, in particular, completion, within the planned deadline, of the second phase of a metallurgical plant, which, incidentally, [words indistinct] saves a considerable amount of hard currency.

In the course of both visits it was determined that the parties' views on many key issues of our time coincided, notably on questions of the struggle for peace and disarmament, on the situation in Africa, the south of Africa in particular.

That's all I have to say. Please, any questions.

[Correspondent] Could you speak in greater detail about the talks on nuclear explosions? How long will they continue, what are the prospects, who will be on the American delegation?

[Gerasimov] I would like to say that it is a good omen that these talks are starting at all. The United States in general holds the position that at present it has no use for a nuclear test ban, it is not to its advantage, and it has put forward several arguments on this, which we have [word indistinct] one after another. For example, we have countered the verification argument by at present meeting half way an initiative group of American scientists and installed appropriate instruments, which quite specifically and 100 percent can verify a nuclear test ban. Although the scientists have long been saying, for several years, that verification of nuclear tests by technical means is possible and sufficient, there were nevertheless statements, including at a high level, and not only in America, in England, for example, that even so it is possible to mislead the other party in some way and conduct nuclear tests secretly. That is not so. I recall that I personally spoke with the managers of the seismological laboratory in Upsala, not far from Stockholm, and they told me that at present this is quite impossible, and they showed me a large log book in which they recorded all nuclear explosions which occurred either in Nevada or somewhere in the neighborhood of Semipalatinsk. This argument was refuted. Many other arguments were just as contrived.

At present the United States is in effect conceding that it needs nuclear explosions simply to upgrade its nuclear arsenal and for the Strategic Defense Initiative. This initiative envisages, among other things, the development of an X-ray laser with nuclear pumping. For this it has to be tested, i.e., it is necessary to carry out a nuclear explosion to be used as a source for this X-ray laser. That is, complete ending of nuclear tests comes in the way of implementation of this presidential dream, this Strategic Defense Initiative, this star wars program. Adelman, who is the director--Kenneth Adelman--director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, declares openly that ending tests is not in the American interest, that such ending is possible only if there is nuclear disarmament. Only when nuclear weapons cease being a deterrent will the Americans be ready to halt tests. The Americans also say that we are ahead of them in the field of nuclear weapons, but a comparison of test figures reveals that there have been many more American tests, and if we proceed from the assumption that the Soviet military and American military are

professional equals, which is probably a correct assumption, then we can draw the conclusion that the Americans are definitely ahead here, and they don't have to catch up. Thus, we, guided by a sense of responsibility for the destinies of the world, have currently halted nuclear tests in order to call upon the United States to follow this example.

As for the time of the talks, this will evidently depend on the readiness of the American side. So far I must note that the aforementioned Adelman expressed a highly pessimistic opinion about the results of the first and second meetings, the meeting of the Standing Consultative Commission and the meeting of experts on halting nuclear tests and verification of nuclear tests.

[Correspondent] [In English] Mr. Gerasimov, ABC. The American scientists who were in Karakallinsk were told that when the Soviet Union resumes nuclear testing they'll have to shut down their seismographic machines. Why? And with the United States now testing in Nevada, how much longer will the Soviet Union let those scientists stay in Kazakhstan?

[Gerasimov] The American scientists are in Kazakhstan, and you yourself, I think, saw them off when they left. They are verifying the non-conducting of explosions in the Soviet Union. They have an agreement with the Academy of Sciences on their stay. As for the question what we will do when we resume nuclear tests, I would prefer that we do not resume those nuclear tests, and I know that the American scientists who were here quite recently, they held a press conference, as well as many other scientists, very many countries, notably from among those who made the Delhi declaration, they have addressed the Soviet Union with advice and a request not to be in a hurry and not to renew tests after the deadline of our unilateral moratorium expires. We are considering this question, but of course, the final response will depend on American behavior.

[Correspondent] [In English] A question from the WASHINGTON POST. Does the visit of the foreign minister of West Germany signify a change in the relations between the Soviet Union and West Germany, and if so, how would you characterize that change?

[Gerasimov] Mr. Genscher's visit is only just beginning. We consider that the Federal Republic of Germany can make its own, very substantial contribution to European security. We note that Mr. Genscher has been coming out frequently in favor of many measures which would lead to an improvement of the situation in Europe. But it is necessary to bring this in line with certain actions, which is why I said that during the talks held today a certain difference was noted between the hopes frequently expressed in the Federal Republic of Germany and practical actions, the practical actions of the Federal Republic of Germany. Otherwise, we are all for improvement, for further development, and I think that we can already predict that as a result of the visit there will be further development in Soviet-West German relations in certain fields. We are for greater mutual understanding with this country, which plays a very important role in Europe in the area of ensuring peace, if only because West Germany resembles a nuclear powder keg, being so stuffed with American nuclear weapons, and the Germans say that they must do everything so that the third world war would not begin from German territory. And

since West Germany resembles a cake filled with American nuclear stuffing, maybe even regardless of the will of the Germans themselves, they will be unable to uphold this pledge of theirs, and this, of course, worries us to some degree.

[Correspondent] Japanese Television. Could you please tell us, I would like to ask the following about the accident. When and in what way will you make public the conclusions of the investigation of the state commission about the accident?

[Gerasimov] We have already published a report about the meeting of [word indistinct] where, in my view, it states in great detail what happened, and very sober conclusions are drawn with regard to those who are to blame for this accident.

[Japan TV Correspondent] Will there be no more information on this accident, in greater detail?

[Gerasimov] I think it is in great detail.

[Japan TV Correspondent] It is in detail, but for example, what experiments were you conducting then?

[Gerasimov] But I think it's clear. It is clear from this report that those experiments were conducted virtually without authorization, without observing appropriate regulations and without the appropriate authorization from the superior organization, frankly speaking, it was those very dangerous unauthorized actions which led to this accident. As for the nature of those experiments, I don't know, perhaps we'll report them. But in general this is not really important.

[Correspondent] [Words indistinct]

[Gerasimov] I am telling you that it seems to me that the report goes into sufficient detail, and when I asked you what other details you wanted [words indistinct] purely technical details.

[Correspondent] [In English] Christopher Walker from the TIMES. To follow up the question from my Japanese colleague, does that mean that there will not be a report per se published here, and in addition to the TASS report yesterday. And I ask this question, because Mr. Velikhov, or Dr. Velikhov, did tell us a few weeks ago that a full report would be published in the middle of August, and that's what sort of got Asake muddled.

[Gerasimov] Well, it's still July, so you see, we're running ahead of schedule by publishing the report on the Politburo meeting. [Words indistinct].

[Correspondent] [Name indistinct], Egypt. Was the question of the Middle East discussed at today's talk between Mr. Gorbachev and Mr. Genscher? And what is the position of the FRG with regard to the latest [words indistinct]?

[Gerasimov] Today's talks were of a nature, well, not confidential, but on the whole of a confidential nature, so when I said that a very wide range of questions were discussed, and taking into account that the talks lasted three hours, I think we can surmise that this question was also touched upon. However, I cannot answer the question as to what specifically. But I think that as the talks continue we'll find, get an answer to this question.

[Correspondent] [In English] [Words indistinct] In relation to Mr. Shevardnadze's visit to London and the agreement he signed. Can you Can you tell me the significance of the huge amount of compensation the Soviet Union is reported to have agreed to pay Britain in relation to the Second World War claims? What is the significance of this timing, could you kindly explain?

[Gerasimov] This was one of the questions, I don't consider it very important, which was a small, I would call it a barb in our relations and impeded the development of these relations. It is very good that the Soviet Union and England have found a way to close it to mutual satisfaction. Incidentally, no party either loses or gains anything, [words indistinct].

[Correspondent] [In English] French Radio and Television]. As to the report, could you, on Chernobyl accident, could you tell us who is now the official president of the commission. As we know, it was Mr. Shcherbina in the beginning. Can you tell us if he is still in charge of the commission officially or if there is a new president of this commission officially today?

[Gerasimov] I don't know the answer to this question, as to who is now chairman of the commission. But I'll answer it at our next meeting.

Are there any other questions?

[Correspondent] [Words indistinct] The question refers to Chernobyl. A few days ago there was a report that the inhabitants had already returned to two villages, two villages from which they had been earlier evacuated. [Words indistinct] those inhabitants from this 50-kilometer zone. Could you say [end of side 1 of tape]

[Side 2 of tape]

[Unidentified speaker] [In Russian] ... Soviet-American consultative commission on compliance with the SALT-2 treaty which starts tomorrow. Will it be in Geneva?

[Gerasimov] Please, are there no more questions? Well, if there are no more questions, thank you for your attention. Till our next meeting.

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## GERASIMOV SPEAKS AT MFA PRESS BRIEFING

Moscow MFA Press Briefing in Russian 24 Jul 86

[Text of press briefing on current international issues by Gennadiy Gerasimov at the Moscow Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Center, 1:30 p.m., Moscow time, 24 July 1986]

[Text] [Gerasimov] ... Tomorrow he will have talks in the Foreign Trade Ministry, the State Committee on Science and Technology, and the Foreign Ministry. We established relations with Uruguay very long ago, 60 years ago, we have good relations based on the principles of non-interference and mutual respect. Our countries are concerned with common problems, such as the threat of a nuclear catastrophe. We are concerned about the arms race. We see a connection between disarmament and development. On the whole, we are justified in expecting the talks to be fruitful.

Next item. I would like to draw your attention to an initiative to which we attach importance: the Soviet initiative at the Geneva Disarmament Conference. At this conference, in the framework of that conference, there is a special group of scientists - experts in seismology. This group, although its work is not reported much, carried out international technical experiments, for example in 1984, in which very many countries took part. Now the Soviet Union suggests that this group should start developing a system of immediate transmission of so-called second-level seismic data. As it was explained to me, second-level seismic data are complete data about seismic signals, complete recordings of seismic signals. This system, in our view, could become the basis for international seismic verification of compliance with a nuclear test ban. That is, we are not only not opposed to verification--for some reason the notion keeps circulating that we are allegedly against verification--we are not only for verification--nowadays everyone is for verification--we also suggest practical measures for technically improving verification.

Next item. On 21 July in Vienna, in the IAEA framework, a conference of government experts opened to draw up an agreement on immediate reporting of accidents at nuclear power plants and an agreement on assistance in case of accidents at such plants. The Soviet Union attaches importance to this conference. It is one of a number of measures to set up an international regime of safe development of the nuclear power industry. The proposal to set up of such a regime was contained in the May 14 address of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev on Soviet television. These proposals were supported at a session of the IAEA board of directors, which decided to convene a special conference of government experts, and it has now opened in Vienna. The Soviet delegation is headed by the permanent Soviet representative at

international organizations in Vienna, Comrade Krestov. The delegation includes authoritative representatives of concerned departments. The purpose of this conference is to draw up, without delay and as quickly as possible, drafts of the agreements I mentioned, so that they could be submitted for consideration at a special session of the IAEA general conference on questions of nuclear industry safety which opens in Vienna on 24 September. The initiative to convene this special session, this special conference, came from the Soviet Union. We expect that the coming special session of the IAEA General Conference will consider the whole range of questions associated with the safe development of the nuclear power industry and outline ways of further improving international cooperation in the field of safe development of nuclear power, in particular, on the basis and within the framework of IAEA.

In this connection, at the last briefing a question was asked about the government commission, the government commission for determining the causes and ways of rapidly overcoming of the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant and limiting its consequences. The commission's task is to determine the causes and eliminate the consequences, eliminate the accident itself and limit the consequences. A question was asked about the experiment. I said at the time that the published report of the CPSU Politburo mentions the experiment specifically. It says here: At the fourth power unit, when it was being placed on routine maintenance, at night, experiments were conducted connected with investigations of the operating regime of the turbine generator. And as stated here, the experiments were not prepared, they were not authorized, they were conducted without necessary controls, and without appropriate safety measures. It is strange that for some reason the question was raised in the West that allegedly there were some kinds of military experiments. This, incidentally, raises the question of journalistic ethics. A journalist should either report facts or report the absence of facts, that there are none, but in any case not make things up. I will return to this question later. As for additional details about the experiments, these are purely technical questions. If you care, I can answer. Tests were conducted of the turbine generator, its ability to provide for the plant's own needs by the use of kinetic energy. It was explained to me that when a turbine generator is turned off, and it is revolving at 3,000 rpm, the kinetic energy can ensure its continued operation for another 40 or 45 minutes and supply the plant's needs, in particular the pumps, and during those moments until emergency power supply is switched on. That is, a very conventional technical experiment, nothing special to it.

There was a question about the commission. The chairman of the commission on the accident and eliminating its consequences, for those who have forgotten, is Boris Yevdokimovich Shcherbina, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. I talked to him. He complained that it seems there were reports in America that he had been either removed or that he had fallen ill, but as Mark Twain remarked, those reports were exaggerated. Representatives of the government commission on the spot--they are also called the back-up members--rotate. Representatives at the level of deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. Currently this representative of the commission on the spot is Comrade [name indistinct], Vladimir [patronymic indistinct]. You understand the structure of the commission? In this connection I would like to say that



perhaps in future we will establish relations of cooperation, that if you have any questions and conjectures with respect, say, to the health of Comrade Shcherbina or something else, that perhaps you would call us up at the Press Center, telephone number 201-7108, and I will try to find the answer to the questions for the upcoming briefing. This way we can perhaps avoid unnecessary lapses, incorrect reports, reports based on assumptions which later turn out to be false.

As for additional information regarding the accident at the Chernobyl AES, as I mentioned last time, the report on the special meeting of the Politburo on this question is sufficiently detailed, and incidentally, this was noted by the Western press. But in mid August the Soviet Union will submit a report to IAEA. It will be a report with addenda, it will have numerous addenda, a very thick report, totalling hundreds of pages.

The next question was the number of villages whose inhabitants will or will not return to their homes. At present it is still too early to speak of the fate of many of such villages. A thorough isotope check is being conducted, and this takes time. For example, you recall that in a 30-kilometer radius around Chernobyl there was a zone, a special zone. Here too, it's not exactly 30 kilometers radius, because some places within that zone are not contaminated or only marginally contaminated, and conversely there may be contaminated areas farther away. In general, a thorough isotopic check is being conducted. To conclude this topic, I would like to once again remind you of the philosophical lesson of Chernobyl. It was very nicely, in my opinion, expressed by the American doctor, Robert Gale, who, as you know, came here, and he is now here, he published an article in the August issue of LIFE magazine. In this article he writes, after a helicopter flight over Chernobyl, when he saw the deserted city, houses without people, and it reminded him of Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Dachau, he writes: "I remembered the words I said during my meeting with Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. If one balances the limited nature of the accident with the enormous medical resources which were required to overcome it, we must abandon any thought that we can effectively react to a nuclear catastrophe on a wider scale." That is all I wanted to tell you today. Please, ask your questions.

[Correspondent] [In English] Wyatt Andrews, CBS. Can you help us out with any other details of the experiments going on? I think it's relevant to give more detail, also because it has been said in the Soviet press many times that those experiments led to the accident, and the reason that these questions keep coming is because the entire world community is interested in how the experiments initiated the accident so that such accidents won't be repeated and so that questions of nuclear safety will be answered.

[Gerasimov] I just told you, with a certain fear of saying something technically incorrect, because I, of course, don't have a good idea of how a turbine generator operates, but as I understand it, if you turn off a motor and a flywheel turns, then for the 40 or 45 minutes while it keeps on rotating, it continues to take this energy. In the experiment they tried to test whether it was possible in some emergency situation to use this kinetic energy to maintain for 40-45 minutes the power plant and its pumps before it, I think in 25 or 30 seconds, switches over to emergency power supply which

should, of course, exist. That is, it's a purely technical question. If you want the full details, take those numerous volumes which will be published by IAEA in a few days. Then all the technical details will be there. That isn't the main point. The main point is not the nature of the experiment. The main thing, as stated in the report on the Politburo meeting, is not that the experiment was conducted, but that it was conducted in violation of safety regulations and there was no due authorization. That is the main thing. And for this people were punished, though that isn't much of a consolation. But of course, we have drawn conclusions from this for the future.

[Correspondent] Japan television. Can we get the detailed report, not through IAEA, but directly from the party, from the Soviet party, the Soviet Union?

[Gerasimov] The report itself for IAEA isn't ready yet. It's almost finished, but not yet ready. When it is finished, I think a copy of the report, when it is sent to Vienna, to IAEA, I think a copy can be obtained and anyone who wishes to can see it. Because this isn't a confidential document, it's a document for discussion at this international conference.

[Correspondent] [In English] The WASHINGTON POST. I just wanted you to clarify, if you will, the position of Shcherbina. Is he... was there a rotation in the head of the commission and he is again head of the commission or exactly what happened to him earlier?

[Gerasimov] I just told you. Maybe the translation somehow wasn't clear enough. When this misfortune happened, firstly, an operational group of the Politburo was set up, headed by Comrade Nikolai Ivanovich Ryzhkov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers. In addition, a commission was set up, a government commission, to establish the causes, to as quickly as possible eliminate the accident at the Chernobyl AES, and to limit its consequences. Comrade Shcherbina was appointed chairman of that commission, and is its chairman, is that clear? He travelled there. He was there the first nine or ten days. After that he returned to Moscow, from where he supervises the work of the commission. But on the spot, the so-called back-up members, the supervision on the spot rotates periodically among different representatives of the Council of Ministers, deputies of the chairman. There is a rotation. Today, Comrade Vladimir Kuzmich Gusev, who, I think, will return shortly. Then he'll be replaced by another comrade. It seems clear to me.

Are there other questions?

[Correspondent] [Words indistinct] Could you comment on the publication that appeared in the GUARDIAN of the so-called Manifesto of the group for socialist renewal?

[Gerasimov] The English newspaper GUARDIAN, thanks to the efforts of its Moscow correspondent, as I understand it, published a strange piece. Some kind of nameless manifesto allegedly written by someone in the Soviet Union, allegedly with the best of intentions, for the renewal of our society. No references to the source are given, so the impression is that this is a muddy

source. My impression is that in the West, too, this so-called document was treated with a grain of salt. This composition presents a list of our shortcomings, aggravated by supplemental untruths and lies, notably, for example, with regard to the sum of the Soviet debt, taken completely out of the blue, for example. Besides, I can't understand why this document, which is apparently old, it was, allegedly, written before the congress, why it has surfaced just now. In any case, the conclusions drawn by the unnamed authors of this document are provocational and anti-socialist and aimed against the leading role of the CPSU in our society. It seems that the purpose of this publication, or I would call it provocation, is to distort the ongoing processes of restructuring Soviet society and rennovating our society, as we are now witnessing.

I have a written question. [Reads] Don't you consider that the meeting [words indistinct] between Shimon Peres and Moroccan King Hassan II is a policy and attempt to wipe out the joint Soviet-French efforts to create [words indistinct] commission for convening an international conference on the Middle East?

I can say that the Soviet Union's position has, of course, not changed because Peres went to see the King of Morocco [words indistinct]. The Soviet Union's position is well known, it is unchanged. We consider that separate deals lead nowhere. Incidentally, the results of this visit are rather pale. We consider that a comprehensive and just Mid East settlement can be found only through the collective efforts of all concerned parties. The road of separate deals is not the right road. Incidentally, I have mentioned before, I recall that French President Mitterand said during the final talks that he, too, thought, that France also thought that the road of bilateral talks could lead to something, but now France has come to the conclusion that this road has no future. That is our unswerving position on a Mid East settlement.

Are there any more questions?

[Correspondent] [In English] [Name indistinct] BBC in London. Can I just clarify this business of the experiments that were going just once more? Are you saying, are you saying that there was a simulated accident? Is that what they were doing? To see if the reactor could continue in operation should there be an accident?

[Gerasimov] No, I didn't say that. What was studied was the capability of the generator, the capability of the generator to operate on kinetic energy. [Words indistinct]. Wait a little longer, if you are so concerned with purely technical details. But I think that when you see the size of the publication and take into account that you journalists are a busy people, I'm not at all sure that you'll care to read this purely scientific document for too long.

Are there any more questions? If there are no more questions, thank you for your attention.

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#### ELEVENTH ANNIVERSARY OF HELSINKI FINAL ACT COMMEMORATED

[The following is the text of an MFA press briefing held in Moscow on 31 July 1986. Participants are Ye. K. Silin, deputy chairman of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation, O. A. Vinerskiy, head of the Soviet delegation to the Stockholm Conference, Major General V. M. Tatarnikov, representative of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, and Professor B. S. Krylov of the All-Union Research Institute for Soviet Law, and an unidentified moderator; conducted in Russian except where noted.]

[Text] [Unidentified moderator] Today's press conference is devoted to the eleventh anniversary of the signing of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Participating in this press conference are Yevgeniy Konstantinovich Silin, deputy chairman of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation, Oleg Alekseyevich Vinerskiy, ambassador and head of the Soviet delegation to the Stockholm Conference on Security- and Confidence-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, Major General Viktor Mikhaylovich Tatarnikov, representative of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, and Professor Boris Sergeyevich Krylov, representative of the All-Union Research Institute for Soviet Law. Our first speaker will be Yevgeniy Konstantinovich [Silin].

[Silin] I welcome the eleventh anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki Final Act; for us this document has never lost and is not now losing its tremendous significance, and over time this significance has grown in the eyes of the Soviet public, in the eyes of the peace-loving public in Europe and around the world. Our public committee, the Soviet Committee for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which is a nongovernmental organization, at the very start of its existence -- it came into being in 1971, when the very first efforts were being made to conclude a multilateral... to make multilateral preparations for a Europe-wide conference -- and later, after the Helsinki Final Act was signed, bases its actions both at home and abroad on this unique document. We feel that both during the good times when detente in Europe was a going concern, and when it began to fail through the fault of certain forces which are opposed to detente, and today, at a time when a very complex situation has arisen around the world and in Europe, this document is the [word indistinct] which allows the peace-loving and realistic-thinking forces in Europe and around the world which support the provisions contained in the Helsinki Final Act to proceed toward normalization of international relations in Europe and around the world, to proceed toward a new period of detente,

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detente which will be on a firmer basis than that which existed during the 1970's, but on the basis of the progress which has been made during the past decade, as expressed in the Helsinki Final Act.

Our organization, in which are represented various public groups -- both trade unions and mass youth and women's organizations -- as well as scientific and cultural figures, is the focus for those who want to carry on and implement, help implement the recommendations contained in the articles of the Helsinki Final Act. We pay close attention to this process. We publish our own works about these... about all developments which are part of the Helsinki process. Last year we published -- and we have copies here today at this press conference -- a report entitled "Europe Ten Years After Helsinki." This year our committee intends to publish another report, one which will encompass this development from the end of the Madrid Conference to the beginning of the conference which will be held, which will begin, rather, on 4 November of this year in Vienna. That will be a very important meeting, one which represents a continuation of the Helsinki process. We take a very serious attitude toward this meeting, both at the official and the public levels; we would like for all the "baskets" created at Helsinki to be filled up, filled with good, beautiful, delicious fruits, as Comrade Gorbachev put it, and we are prepared to render the most constructive assistance in this process and at this meeting in Helsinki. Gathered here today are both representative of the Soviet Government and representatives of the public, who can tell you what the Soviet Union as a country is doing in this direction, what the Soviet public is doing to commemorate this date, and what is being done to mark the eleventh anniversary of Helsinki in the present difficult situation which we have been experiencing this summer. Yet I should note a special coincidence: it was precisely this summer period, these past few months, which was filled with international events which were a good reflection of efforts, particularly on the part of the Europeans, to change relations in Europe for the better. Soviet diplomacy, the Soviet Union and its allies have done a great deal in this direction; I will not list the very important statements, I will not rehash the contents of the statement made by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev on 15 January, and later the all-encompassing program for worldwide security proposed at the 27th CPSU Congress, which also was to a certain degree devoted to Europe. And we hope that it will be in Europe that the process of creating such a system will begin, especially since the foundations for this system have already been laid down in the [Helsinki] Final Act. This also means the appeal by the participants in the political consultation committee of Warsaw Pact countries, an appeal made at their meeting in Budapest; it means the very important bilateral meetings which have taken place between the leaders of the Soviet Union and the leaders of a whole series of European countries, [meetings] which play an important role in European world policy -- I am referring to the summit meeting between France and the USSR, the meetings between the USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs and English government officials, the visit to the USSR by the FRG minister of foreign affairs, the visit to the USSR by the Turkish prime minister, who is also a participant in the all-European process, and so forth. As for the Soviet public, we on the Soviet Committee for European Security are also attempting to make a contribution to the realization of the principles embodied both in the Helsinki Final Act and in the concluding document of the Madrid Conference. As I have already said, we intend to publish a report covering the period from Madrid to Vienna. In

the near future, within the framework of our committee there will be established a new public commission, an addition to those which currently exist, a commission which will deal with the humanitarian sphere and the area of human rights. I hope that this commission will also make a contribution to the cultivation of issues which are of interest to the public in both Western and Eastern Europe.

With that I would like to conclude; I hope that my colleagues seated here at this table will answer other questions which are of interest to you, questions pertaining to measures for political detente in Europe. Afterward we will reply to any further questions you might have. Thank you.

[Moderator] I would like to add something to what Yevgeniy Konstantinovich [Silin] has just said. We are hoping to be able to present to you sometime in mid-November, jointly with the Committee for European Security, the brochure which was just mentioned, "From Madrid to Vienna," to international journalists and [word indistinct].

I will now turn the floor over to Oleg Alekseyevich Vinerskiy.

[Vinerskiy] I believe that I am qualified to speak with you concerning what is going on at the Stockholm Conference. [Pause] The Soviet Union has in the past attached and continues to attach great significance to the Stockholm forum as a component of the all-European process which in large part determines the form [of that process]. A little over one month ago the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, at one of its sessions, examined the status of the Stockholm Conference On Security- and Confidence-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. The Soviet delegation, upon its instructions, has been working hard to achieve, on the basis of mutuality, a positive conclusion to this important international forum. Quite frankly, this past month has been a difficult time, a time of acute political struggle aimed at beginning the process of unraveling unresolved problems. And gradually progress has begun to be made at the conference. The atmosphere has taken a noticeable change for the better; there has opened up the prospect that [the conference] could possibly yield some results. Above all, there has been success in resolving the question of notification of air force maneuvers, resolving a deadlock which had long hindered progress at the conference.

The socialist countries have always been in favor of and continue to be in favor of notification of all major surface maneuvers; this applies to all forms of armed forces. However, the NATO countries have categorically refused to agree to notification concerning movements of their air forces. It was between these two points of view that there occurred a lengthy struggle at the conference. A compromise solution was found, based upon the establishment of an air force sub-level equivalent to the level at which notification of maneuvers by infantry would begin, beginning at which level certain important information would be provided concerning air force training exercises. According to experts' estimates, this treaty will encompass practically 90 percent of all air force activity in Europe, including that which is most dangerous from the standpoint of [the possibility of launching] a surprise attack. This achievement is heartening; many participants in the talks made a contribution to the achievement of this accord by demonstrating the political

will required to reach an agreement. In light of this solution to the problem, as was stated by Poland's representative, the socialist countries are prepared to begin transferring negotiations on the notification issue to the question of individual maneuvers[?] at the next state of the conference, and to the question of naval maneuvers as well.

On the issue of maneuvers by ground forces, which is being considered on the basis of [words indistinct], an agreement has been reached in recent days to the effect that notification will encompass infantry maneuvers conducted in conjunction with air force and navy components, [word indistinct] and paratroops. What remains to be discussed are the parameters of such notification. As you are aware, the socialist countries... took a step toward meeting the wishes of both NATO and the neutral and nonaligned nations halfway. It has been proposed that we lower the threshold of notification so that it would cover maneuvers by units of 18,000 men. The NATO countries have declared their willingness to reduce this number, yet despite promises have not yet announced any specific numbers. So on this issue it is obviously possible to reach a mutually acceptable agreement, on a basis of mutuality, of course.

A great deal of work has also been done with respect to concretization and implementation of the principle of renunciation of the use of force. Now our task is to see this work through to the end. There are no fundamental difficulties with regard to this question. In order to speed up the process of drafting [a proposal], the socialist countries are prepared to accept as a basis the proposals made by the neutral and nonaligned countries, as well as to take into consideration the positive elements contained in NATO proposals. [Pause] Of course, in order to bring the conference to a successful conclusion the delegates must still deal with quite a few complex issues. One of them concerns notification of troop transfers to Europe from other regions and continents. There is a possibility of achieving this, as long as the principles of prompt notification of troop transfers to Europe are complied with strictly. However, although this is possible, [words indistinct].

The problem of how to limit the size of military exercises remains just as difficult as before. So that progress will be made on this issue, the socialist countries have agreed in principle to accept the proposals made by the neutral and nonaligned countries. These provide a multitude of opportunities for reaching agreements which would make it possible to limit the scale of military maneuvers conducted in Europe which, as in the case of the oft-cited NATO maneuvers, reach such a size, such a scale, that it becomes difficult to differentiate between maneuvers and actual deployment of troops for the beginning of military operations.

Finally, there is the problem of verification. The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, I am firmly convinced, will strictly observe all the agreements signed by them. Therefore we are in favor of including adequate means of verification in any agreement on confidence-building measures. As you know, the proposal made by the Warsaw Pact nations in Budapest contains an outline for a program of confidence-building measures, as well as on-site verification. In accordance with this proposal we are prepared to consider the question of on-site inspections, and we believe that in this area as well

we see a readiness, particularly on the part of the socialist countries, to conclude an agreement under which all signatories would conduct on-site checks on compliance with confidence-building measures, as part of the process of conventional forces control and limitation in Europe.

This poses a legitimate question: what do we do now in order to resolve all these problems and ensure success in Stockholm? As Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, has stated, it is time that all conference participants demonstrate responsibility and [word indistinct]. Only serious mutual [word indistinct] on a basis of equality can yield positive results. The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries have already taken quite a few steps toward resolution of such key issues as notification, exchange of annual plans concerning scheduled military activities, invitation of observers to attend [maneuvers], limitations on the scale of maneuvers, renunciation of the use of force, verification, and other issues. [The Soviet Union] hopes that the proposals which we made on 18 July at the end of a [word indistinct] session will add dynamism to the Vienna Conference as well, so that it will be able to conclude its work quickly. We value highly the efforts which have been made and continue to be made by the neutral and nonaligned countries to achieve progress at the conference. But in order to experience steady progress, we need changes in the West's positions as well.

The time factor is beginning to play a more and more important role. We are not advocates of hasty diplomatic dealing, in which agreements are concluded hurriedly and at the last moment. If the work of this conference is not intensified, then there may not be enough time, even if there is evidence of good will. Therefore we welcome the mutual agreement which has been achieved at the conference that the time remaining until the close of the conference will be utilized to conduct unofficial meetings between delegations. This will help speed the process of reaching an agreement on issues which currently remain unresolved.

Thank you.

[Moderator] Esteemed comrades, ladies and gentlemen, now we will go on to the question-and-answer period. As customary, we will alternate between oral and written questions.

[NOVOSTI PRESS AGENCY correspondent] I have a question for the ambassador. [Words indistinct] frankly speaking does there exist the possibility of a successful conclusion to the Stockholm forum in the near future?

[Vinerskiy] I should... I want to say [words indistinct]. I feel that, both from the standpoint of the issues which are being discussed at the conference, and from the standpoint of the situation, so to speak, around the stage, yes, there is such a possibility. It is possible both in terms of the nature of the issue and in terms of the desire, most of all the desire on the part of the majority, I would say virtually all European countries to conclude an agreement. Of course, as to whether this possibility will be realized, that remains to be seen: will [these opportunities] be utilized, will an agreement become a reality? Will we see a real desire on the part of all parties, in



particular the United States and its principal allies, to come to an agreement, to carry the negotiations to the point where an agreement on limiting [word indistinct] can be reached?

[Moderator] We have a written question, then we will take another oral one. The weekly ARGUMENTY I FAKTY poses the following question to Major-General Tatarnikov: "What new developments in terms of security- and confidence-building measures can we expect from Stockholm, as compared to the Helsinki Final Act?"

[Tatarnikov] First of all I would like to say that the [Helsinki] Final Act contained no [word indistinct] of confidence-building measures, but it is currently being implemented, as for example with respect to the invitation of observers to be present at military maneuvers. Currently we are inviting observers to attend military exercises, and European states have the opportunity to see for themselves the nonthreatening nature of those military operations. And what will come out of Stockholm now? First of all I should say that the region in which confidence-building measures are to be applied will be expanded. Whereas previously notification has been conducted in Europe to the east of our border, now this zone will extend all the way to the Urals. This step on the part of the Soviet Union kept quiet. Furthermore, there are plans for the discussion and adoption by the conference of a certain set of measures which represent a major step forward in the realm of security- and confidence-building measures.

Planned is not only notification of maneuvers by infantry forces, as is currently the case, but also by [word indistinct] forces, paratroops, as well as information concerning air force exercises which are conducted in conjunction with infantry maneuvers. These are very important offensive components, which will be included [under an agreement]. Furthermore, I should say that completely new parameters for notification are being drawn up, parameters at a lower level. Whereas previously the notification threshold was for maneuvers involving 25,000 troops, now we are talking about a somewhat lower ceiling. We have proposed notification of all maneuvers involving more than 18,000 troops, but we are prepared to discuss an even lower threshold [words indistinct]. Observers from all the European countries participating in this conference will be invited to all such maneuvers. Representatives of all 34 states participating in this conference will have the right to be personally present at maneuvers which are subject to notification. Furthermore, the most important new development as compared to the Helsinki Final Act will be exchange ahead of time of plans for military exercises. These plans will give a panoramic overview of military activities by [word indistinct]. That is, every European state will be able to predict when a given state will be conducting military activities, for how long, and at what scale. This is a very important measure; as you know, it was proposed by Comrade Gorbachev during his visit to Paris. Furthermore, as you are aware, we are insisting on limitations which would govern the size of military maneuvers. However, we must acknowledge that this measure does not sit well with the NATO countries. They do not want to limit their maneuvers; however, we are convinced that there is the possibility of making progress on the question of limitation at the Stockholm Conference.

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And that bring us to the question of renunciation of the use of force [words indistinct]. In this fashion we could open up numerous opportunities for security- and confidence-building measures. This would represent development of the Helsinki Final Act. And if the conference which is now drawing to a close could successfully resolve this issue, then of course this would be a very useful and [significant] step in the realm of the development of security and confidence in Europe.

[Moderator] Questions, please.

[PRAVDA correspondent, (name indistinct)] I have a question for Ambassador Verinskiy. You have used the term "success" in connection with the Stockholm Conference. Could you tell us what this actually entails? And what significance could success at the Stockholm Conference have in the context of the overall political situation in Europe and in the world at large?

[Verinskiy] Success at the conference in Stockholm. I believe this has only one interpretation: the conclusion of the Stockholm Conference with substantial, specific and significant agreements. And I feel that that would be a significant moment not only with regard to the situation in Europe. Why? Because it is precisely in this direction, that of giving examples of confidence-building measures, that it is possible to achieve a turnaround not only in Europe, but also in the international arena. To a certain degree, success in Stockholm would be a springboard to success at the all-European conference in Vienna to be held in the fall of this year; it would also guarantee a good beginning for the second round of negotiations in Stockholm, and could provide the basis for dealing productively with the issue of disarmament in Europe. [Section omitted for tape change]

[Krylov?] [Begins in mid-sentence; sentence indistinct] ...because this is linked to the fate of Europe. It is a unique document in the sense that it places certain obligations on all signatories, what is more, it places obligations on all signatories together, and on each one individually [words indistinct]. It is a document whose significance we can already see today through [words indistinct] alone. And [words indistinct] this document is extremely innovative in terms of security measures. [Words indistinct] this is an issue which is little [word indistinct], yet which it is extremely important that we resolve.

[Unidentified moderator] Questions, please?

[Annette Gordon, REUTERS NEWS AGENCY correspondent -- in English] I'd like to ask Mr. Silin. You said that you were creating an information [word indistinct] on human rights and humanitarian issues that would be of interest to the West and Western Europe. Could you be a little bit more specific about what the issues are? I'm a bit confused.

[Silin] Currently we are holding consultations with the highest organs of the Soviet public; many have expressed an interest in successful cooperation within the framework of the Helsinki Final Act in the field of human rights as well. We are considering these issues within the framework of improvement of our Soviet socialist legal system, of our socialist mechanism. The primary

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task of our commission will be to help that segment of the Soviet public which is interested in these issues become more familiar with Soviet legislative acts, the Soviet laws and legal system which protect the rights of Soviet citizens. Presently, as you are aware, major efforts are being undertaken to protect the rights of Soviet working people. On this subject you can read reports in the press, hear speeches by Soviet leaders, and see the work of our trade unions and other Soviet public organizations. Our commission would like to generalize all of these joint efforts and compare them with the terms contained in the Helsinki Final Act and in subsequent documents, in particular the concluding document of the Madrid Conference. We want to inform the Soviet public about this more widely, and we want this to be more widely known abroad, because abroad an... uh, distorted picture of how the Soviet Union observes human rights is widespread. A calmer examination of this issue, free of ideological attacks and deception, would help clarify to what degree various countries do in fact protect human rights; this could serve as the basis for international cooperation in this area. This is precisely what Soviet delegations and Soviet representatives are striving for at a meeting of experts on these questions in [Ottawa?]. This was the goal of the Soviet delegation, the representatives of the Soviet people, at the conference on topics of humanitarian cooperation in Bern. As you will recall, in Bern the representatives of 34 states -- with great diversity in their approach to this problem, with ideological differences between the representatives of the various countries -- these 34 states from all over the European continent produced a very interesting document pertaining to humanitarian cooperation. I have that document here before me; perhaps some of you are even familiar with it. Only the U.S. delegation refused, at the very last moment, to agree to this already completed document, thereby sabotaging the adoption of this document, [word indistinct] this [word indistinct] document. This is a voluminous document covering the most diverse aspects of cooperation and exchange between people. Our committee intends to publish this document in its next issue of [name of journal indistinct]; other organs of the Soviet press will also be publishing it. But, as declared by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, we can nevertheless use this document as the basis for our practical actions in all those areas in which we intended to, and we are prepared to cooperate on the basis of this document's contents with those countries which are willing to uphold the provisions of this document on a bilateral basis. This is very satisfying to us, and I believe that one of our main concern [phrase indistinct] will be implementation of the provisions included in this document, as well as those found in the Helsinki Final Act. But that is just one aspect of our commission's work. I feel that this commission, which is currently being established, will outline a broad plan of action; once this plan is drawn up we will probably have an opportunity to present to you this plan and the commission's intentions in greater detail than at the present time.

Thank you for your attention.

[Moderator] Boris Sergeyevich Krylov, do you have anything to add?

[Krylov] I would just like to say a few words about what is provided for in the Law on [words indistinct]. This is merely an expansion of the utilization of those rights which citizens already enjoy, and primarily that means work by

public organizations to realize them, of course with the support of the press and state organs.

[Moderator] Questions?

[NBC NEWS correspondent, (name indistinct) -- in English] I think that anyone around here with a "distorted" view would be happy to hear about these new emphases on human rights. Can you tell us if that will include making it easier for people, Jews and others, who wish to leave the USSR to emigrate, or will permit foreign broadcasts without fear of jamming, or will allow families to emigrate in order to be reunited? And, if these are not among the areas, why were they not included?

[Krylov] You see, there are two sides to this question...

[Moderator] [Words indistinct] you use the word "repatriation" to Israel.

[Krylov] There are two aspects. One is the desire [to emigrate]. To cite statistics [words indistinct], the number of persons wishing to emigrate has sharply declined, according to statistical data published by the UN. The other aspect concerns the existence of obstacles to emigration, of which there are none except for those provided for in international agreements. And in order to speed up the [emigration] process, for instance on our end, a great deal has been done recently. The time limit for reviewing [emigration] cases has been shortened, as has been the time limit required before a petition can be reexamined if it is turned down for one reason or another, for example for security reasons. [Sentence indistinct]. So there has been all-round progress. As for why the number of individuals wishing to emigrate has declined, that is the fault of the places to which they are emigrating[?].

[Moderator to correspondent] Are you satisfied?

[NBC NEWS correspondent -- in English] [Words indistinct] Sorry, if you're asking whether I am satisfied with the answer, I did not hear an answer to the question...

[Moderator] Do you have another question? [Pause] Would you like to ask another question?

[NBC NEWS correspondent -- in English] I'm asking the same question as before. There's also the matter of families, of...

[Moderator] So, you would like some additional explanation, is that correct?

[NBC NEWS correspondent -- in English] The same question I raised before. [Words indistinct].

[Moderator] You understand... allow me to make a comment...

[NBC NEWS correspondent -- in English] Sorry, it was a long question, let me...

[Moderator] There is one basic misunderstanding here. You must understand that here in the Soviet Union Jews enjoy absolutely equal rights. That is, there is no discrimination against them as compared to other ethnic groups, nor do they have any special privileges. In the Soviet Union being a Jew does not bring any privileges or discrimination. Therefore all the limitations on emigration which are applicable to Russians -- for instance, [a Russian] knows a state secret, or has served in the army, and therefore may not emigrate for a certain number of years, or else there are some other problems, such as elderly parents or a wife with a small child which he is obligated to support, of which he is the sole source of support -- these are applicable to all, Jews included, you understand? [To Krylov] Would you like to explain further?

[Krylov] It seems odd that this question is asked concerning a single nationality; because in our there does not exist any sort of differences or discrimination [words indistinct] and the nationalities question.

[Indistinct voices]

[Krylov] Of course, there are nationalities in our country which, as a result of historical circumstances, are in a somewhat special situation from other as a result of different cataclysms which occurred during World War II. You are aware that a significant portion of Jewish families, but not only Jews, members of other nationalities as well -- were split up. In this connection, of course, there was a time when the process of reuniting these families went on at a fairly intensive pace, yet also with consideration given to the rules, statutes and system which are applicable to all Soviet citizens. Today this process has naturally slowed down, due to the fact that a significant number of families have been restored, reunited, and therefore the flow [of emigrants] has begun to dry up. There are also other reasons: in the Middle East many people find themselves unwanted. Therefore there is no need to talk specially about constantly supporting, artificially supporting the emigration of people of a certain nationality at the level of, say, 10 or 15 years ago. You know the [word indistinct] reasons for this. [Sentence indistinct].

[Moderator] Questions, please?

[NBC NEWS correspondent -- in English] Would you answer the question which I asked?

[Moderator] You are unsatisfied, as before? [Indistinct voices] Maybe we should hold a special meeting for you, where you could talk with the appropriate representatives, so as not to digress from the actual topic [of today's press conference]? We will speak to you individually after the press conference, if you are so interested in this topic.

[Anatoliy Smirnov, NOVOSTI PRESS AGENCY correspondent] I have a question for Academician Boris Sergeyevich Krylov: how has Soviet legislation changed in light of this agreement? Specifically, what sort of [legal] code standards and regulations were adopted in recent years, and how does the Soviet legal system perceive opportunities which would in the future foster the development of exchange, intercourse and contacts? Thank you.

[Krylov] Well, the past decade has been an extremely active one in terms of legislation. The first and most important document was the [Soviet] Constitution of 1977; this constitution provides for expansion of citizens' rights as compared to the 1936 Constitution, for significant progress. This progress is due above all to the general development of our society. It contains [word indistinct] articles pertaining to the Helsinki accord. You can be quite sure that in this sense our constitution is unique, in that it embodies the fundamental principles of our foreign policy, the same principles contained in the Helsinki Final Act. And now [words indistinct] must be reinforced and developed further. This is the principle of contacts between countries. There is a second article which is directly connected with Helsinki. This is the article which obligates Soviet citizens to foster the development of amicable cooperation with the peoples of other countries, to support the maintenance and strengthening of universal peace. There are also articles which pertain to guarantees of each citizen's rights and freedoms.

This constitution is accompanied by a whole series of acts which are connected with this issue. Basically, these are the Citizenship Law of 1979 and the 1981 Law on the Legal Rights of Foreigners, which protects the rights of foreigners, particularly those permanently resident in the USSR, in all basic aspects of national affairs, except for the political aspects, of course. But in terms of working conditions and social conditions, foreigners are guaranteed virtually everything which is guaranteed to Soviet citizens.

You mentioned other issues as well [words indistinct]. I need only mention the simplification of the procedure governing marriages between Soviet citizens and foreigners and reunification of international families. In our country no problem exists in this area, simply because the procedure is identical both for marriages with Soviet citizens and with foreigners. This is more a problem of selecting the proper wife or husband, not a legal problem.

The process of development of rights is an ongoing process. And it will continue. [This process] is largely dependent upon citizens' needs and the state's physical capabilities. There is your answer.

[Moderator] Thank you. Questions, please.

[Unidentified correspondent] I have a question for Yevgeniy Konstantinovich Silin. As the Soviet ambassador has stated, the Stockholm Conference has given cause for guarded optimism. But now the time factor has entered the picture, therefore upcoming forums are very important. My question concerns that: with what intentions are you going to the November meeting in Vienna? What do you expect from it, and what can we expect to see?

[Silin] I assume that this question pertains to the Soviet public's position, or perhaps the position of those circles of foreigners with which I have had contacts; recently we have had a very intensive exchange of opinions with representatives of public groups with all kinds of political leanings, from virtually all the European countries. We have received the impression that the Soviet public, representatives of public organizations in the socialist

countries and representatives of public organizations in Western countries -- whether Social Democrats, Christian Democrats, representatives of [words indistinct], in the course of... representatives of various ideologies, believers and nonbelievers, believers of various faiths -- are all hoping to see the meeting in Vienna unfold successfully. Several important forums have been held, directly expressing a whole series of requests or, if you like, demands to the participants in the Vienna Conference, the Vienna meeting. I would like to say that just recently a conference of the Interparliamentary Union was held. This very old international organization, which unites parliamentarians from various countries on an unofficial basis, met in Bonn at the end of May this year, and drew up a very interesting document. If you have an opportunity to read it, please take a look at this document, in which the views of the most diverse social groups in Western and Eastern Europe are expressed, and which basically embodies the wish that the Vienna meeting will represent substantial progress on all three "baskets" of the Helsinki Final Act. Similar meetings were also held in Brussels; there there was a meeting of the International Committee for European Security and Cooperation. Recently we took part in a large conference in Vienna dedicated to questions of economic and scientific-technical cooperation between countries in East and West. This conference, too, drew up a whole series of specific recommendations pertaining to the second "basket" of the Helsinki Final Act. What is the gist of all those recommendations? Firstly, to ensure that the process of security, of collective security in Europe, will continue. From this point of view, one of the first wishes expressed is that the Stockholm Conference will have a successful conclusion and, furthermore, that this phase of the Stockholm Conference, which is devoted to security- and confidence-building measures, will conclude on 19 September, as provided for at the Madrid Conference. Ambassador Venerskiy has told you about the efforts which are currently being made in Stockholm to ensure that the participants in the conference will by that time successfully fulfill the mandate placed upon them by the Madrid meeting. If this is accomplished, then there opens up the possibility a new mandate will be drawn up for the Stockholm Conference prior to the Vienna Conference, a mandate which would relate directly to the process of disarmament in Europe, a process of which the peoples of Europe dream, so that these confidence-building measures which are currently being discussed will mark the beginning of the disarmament process. Where can such issues be discussed? One option is to do so at the continuation of the Stockholm Conference. As we have already said, the socialist countries have put forth a large-scale, fully-developed program of [word indistinct] reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe. Where can [this program] be discussed? Probably one of the places to do so is at the continuation of the Stockholm Conference. The public has expressed in no uncertain terms its wishes on this question. The same may be said of the question of the destruction of the means of mass extermination of human beings, both nuclear, chemical and other types of weapons, with which Europe is currently literally overflowing. And we should consider not only this aspect -- we must develop another "basket" as well. I have already mentioned the recommendations which were put forth by the Vienna Conference on new forms of cooperation between East and West. It includes completely new elements which have just been developed by representatives of business, economic and scientific circles, representatives of the East and the West, such forms of cooperation as joint ventures[?], for example, new forms of financing economic exchange -- all this

could be made a part of the new document which will be drawn up in Vienna. But in the humanitarian and [word indistinct] elements we regret greatly that neither the Ottawa meeting, nor the cultural forum in Budapest, nor the Vienna meeting, which almost achieved an agreement at one point, ever succeeded in drawing up a completed document. But we hope that on the basis of those proposals which were put forward in Ottawa, and at [word indistinct] and Budapest, and in Bern, proposals which had the consensus of almost all the participants at those meetings, that in Vienna it will be possible to come to some agreement which would result in a substantial document among the agreements which will be concluded in Vienna. That is what the international public is expecting from the meeting in Vienna, not just the Soviet public, but the public of all European countries.

Thank you for your attention.

[Moderator] The magazine SOVETSKIY VOIN inquires of General Tatarnikov: "Do NATO countries such as the United States, which are located far from Europe but which have troops there, exert any pressure with regard to the adoption of acceptable solutions on the issue of prior notification of military exercises to be conducted by NATO member states?"

[Tatarnikov] I would like to say that not only the pressure, but also the measures themselves bear the stamp of purely one-sided interests. I am referring to the proposals put forward by the NATO states. A strange stamp is on these proposals in the sense that they would make it seem that nothing else exists in the world except infantry, as if we were still in the Middle Ages, and that there exists no powerful military aviation, no navies, no other types of troops. Basically, only infantry exists, and nothing else. Why this approach? Well, because, to speak plainly, the United States has few troops in Europe, roughly four divisions plus some other units, and its reinforcements would have to be deployed from across the ocean, if necessary. However, meanwhile, the United States and NATO possess a powerful air force in Europe, a very large air force, including planes capable of carrying nuclear warheads. They possess a mighty fleet. Yet they refuse to consider prior notification of anything except the activities of infantry [words indistinct], and avoid talking about aviation and the navy, which represent [words indistinct]. However, the majority of states insist upon notification of the activities of all types of armed forces, of both infantry and of aviation, which, frankly, hangs over Europeans. And of activities by navies.

Now, as Ambassador Vinerskiy has said, and I will not repeat what he said, agreement have been reached pertaining to aviation and to naval forces. All in all, we can expect agreements and confidence-building measures governing independent exercises by air and naval forces at the second stage of the [Stockholm] Conference.

Currently the situation is such that, despite a lack of time, we are working toward a balanced agreement which would encompass both aviation and [words indistinct]. That is my answer.

[Moderator] Any more questions?



[ABC correspondent, (name indistinct) -- in English] I would like to ask Andy's question again. What will you be talking about in the commission concerning jamming of foreign broadcasts in the Soviet Union [words indistinct]?

[Silin] That is a strange question. [Sentence indistinct]. I understand what you are talking about. The commission was not created to draft new measures to improve the situation with regard to mutual flow of information between countries. When [words indistinct] the commission...[tape ends in mid-sentence].

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## GERASIMOV ON SOVIET MORATORIUM EXTENSION

Moscow MFA Press Briefing in Russian 19 Aug 86

[The following is the text of a press briefing held by Gennadiy Gerasimov 19 August 1986 at 3:00 p.m. Moscow time, at the Moscow Foreign Ministry Press Center; briefing conducted in Russian, except as noted]

[Text] [Gerasimov] ...as you know, the Soviet leadership has made the important decision to extend the unilateral nuclear explosions moratorium until 1 January of next year, moreover to cover all explosions: nuclear weapons tests, as well as explosions for peaceful purposes. This was not an easy decision, because the moratorium has been continuing for a year already. The United States hasn't followed our good example and during this year has carried out 18 explosions. Only 15 were announced. We say there were 18, which is added proof of the capabilities of national technical verification systems. At one of the briefings I mentioned that after 6 August, a US State Department spokesman alleged that there were indications that the Soviet Union was preparing a new series of nuclear tests. I would like to ask him where he got that information. The Voice of America radio station, which is a government, an official station, broadcast worldwide that the Soviet Union was preparing to resume tests after August 6. I would like to know on what this radio station based its forecasts and predictions. Or perhaps it was simply voicing some wishful thinking, because the official American reaction is actually one of regret that the Soviet Union refuses to play their game.

But it was London which proved to be more of a royalist than the king himself. A Reuter report from London is headed: "Britain Regrets Gorbachev's Unilateral Extension of Test Ban." I'll repeat this. [Repeats in English]. A British Foreign Ministry spokesman declared, "We regret, [in English] we regret, [in Russian] that the Soviet Union has concentrated its efforts on such unilateral approaches. [In English] Unilateral approaches."

[In Russian] We feel that nuclear tests are the link in the chain, which, if grasped, could be used to pull the whole chain up and resolve the problem of reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons. It is the start which is needed to begin the advance along this road. Nor is this a unilateral approach. On the contrary, we are inviting the United States, as well as Britain, to join the moratorium, but we warn that we cannot prolong it indefinitely. As for US officials, it is reported that they have rated our move as propaganda, [in English] propaganda ploy. [In Russian] But why not respond to such

propaganda in kind, with the same kind of propaganda? Why not compete with us and also cease tests? Our move is not propaganda. It is a move prompted by common sense, a new mentality, extensive thought. It is fraught with certain military and economic losses for us. But we think it is necessary to look for ways of ending the arms race.

In his statement on Soviet television yesterday evening Comrade Gorbachev again spoke of a new mentality, that an explosion of even a small portion of the accumulated nuclear potential would be an irreparable catastrophe. It has been said that if anyone ventured to carry out a first nuclear strike, they would perish, not even from a retaliatory strike, but from the consequences of the explosions of their own warheads. He who lifts the nuclear sword will perish by his own sword. It is criminal not to take this into account. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev stressed that Soviet foreign policy is based on an understanding of the profound changes that have taken place in the world. This is an understanding which the other side is clearly lacking. Militarization of strategic thinking continues there; far from anything new, it is the old mentality. Contrived arguments against the ending of tests are put forward. For example, the argument about the difficulty or even impossibility of verification.

It would seem that the mist has been cleared here, dispersed, especially after the Soviet Union's agreement to on-site inspections, not only theoretical agreement but a practical move: American scientists came with their instruments to the Semipalatinsk area. The American and other scientists have spoken here, in this hall, saying that the problem of verification no longer exists, it is being resolved by joint efforts. The Soviet Union, in particular, is amenable to any procedures, including international verification measures, as proposed by the Delhi Six leaders. The issue is not verification; the issue is unwillingness to continue (sic) the arms race. But nevertheless--how many times can one keep repeating the same things over and over again?--nevertheless Larry Speakes, who speaks for the White House, stated in response to the extension of our moratorium the following: "The main obstacle is verification procedures which would be acceptable to the United States." That is, the verification argument is put forward again, though it would seem to have been refuted once and for all. The final American position on this issue looks like this: "Tests are needed to assure the reliability, survivability and effectiveness of our nuclear deterrence." But our military could say likewise. This is a two-sided argument, an argument which can be put forward by the other side. But if both sides gave up nuclear tests they would be in an equal position.

It is sometimes said in response to this that the Soviet Union is ahead and America has to catch up. Returning again to Larry Speakes, whom I like to quote so much, he says, commenting, and in this case he was ahead of the Soviet side. Commenting on our decision to extend the moratorium, he said that the United States was in the middle of a response to Soviet modernization by carrying out its own modernization. However, this argument isn't worth much either. Actually, the United States is in the middle of an attack of technological arrogance, hoping to pass us at the next military-technological bend. It is in the middle of self-confidence, hoping to invent some innovation that would make our knees quiver and shake.

As for who is ahead and who is lagging, who is modernizing in order to catch up with the other's modernization, it is enough to recall that according to the Swedish Defense Institute, at the time of the introduction of the Soviet moratorium the United States had carried out 780 tests. Add to this another 18 tests, and we have 798. Say 800, to round it out. The Soviet Union, according to that institute, has carried out 565 tests. Subtracting the first figure from the second, we get an American excess, an excess of more than 230 tests, an enormous lead. If I were in the American generals' shoes I would be very surprised if I suddenly heard that they were lagging behind the Soviet generals with such a great lead: having carried out more than 230 more tests than the Soviet side, they suddenly find that they have to catch up with that Soviet side. I think it would be more correct to assume that the American generals are at approximately the same professional level as the Soviet generals. So who is catching up with whom? Nevertheless, we consider that the time has come to halt tests and move in the direction of nuclear disarmament.

Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev has appealed to President Reagan to once again impartially review the current situation, set aside everything extraneous, he expressed readiness, even confidence, in the possibility of achieving an agreement on the banning of nuclear tests already in the near future and signing it already this year at the Soviet-American summit meeting.

This is my main statement. I have two additional ones.

When the unforeseen accident occurred in Chernobyl--totally unexpected and unprecedented--many people reproached the Soviet Union for delaying notification of other countries about this. On May 14, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev suggested setting up an international regime of safe development of the nuclear industry, including early notification of accidents. August 15 saw the conclusion in Vienna of an IAEA conference of government experts on drawing up drafts of a convention on timely notification about nuclear accidents and of help in case of such accidents. The experts worked for four weeks. Not much, but there apparently was the desire to achieve results. The results are there. The texts of these important documents have been agreed, and they will provide a basis, or at least become important elements, of an international legal regime of safe development of the nuclear power industry. [Words indistinct]. The notification system will be applied to nuclear accidents on any nuclear installations, including those of defense significance. It will cover nuclear installations on surface ships, submarines, nuclear energy sources in space vehicles, nuclear munitions, nuclear tests. In accordance with the convention provisions stipulated in the draft, all nations are obliged to give notification of all cases of nuclear accidents--they are obliged, except for accidents with nuclear weapons and during nuclear explosions, of which the nuclear powers may inform other countries. That is, in this case, in the latter case, notification is not mandatory, but notification may be given. I would like to draw your attention to an essential difference in the positions of the two states. The Soviet Union in Vienna was prepared to accept mandatory notification in cases of accidents involving nuclear weapons or during nuclear explosions. The United States opposed this. The convention drafts will be submitted for a special session of the IAEA general conference on questions of safe

development of the nuclear power industry. It will be held in Geneva September 24-26. The initiator of holding such a special conference was the Soviet Union. We expect that this forum will outline ways of improving international cooperation in this important area.

The third and last topic I would like to speak on, because if I don't I'll be asked. Yesterday, 18 August, in Helsinki a meeting took place between consular officials of the foreign ministries of the Soviet Union and Israel. As I have already said before, this was a meeting of a preliminary nature. The two countries' consular officials were to have discussed how to discuss two essentially consular issues, namely, Soviet property in Israel and consular assistance to Soviet citizens in Israel. At the Helsinki meeting the head of the Israeli group, Mr. (Oram)--I was once asked who headed it--ministerial assistant for East European countries, made a political statement. For example, he spoke of methods of solving, settling the Middle East crisis, which, of course, has nothing to do with consular issues. Moreover, the Israeli side raised the question of Soviet citizens of Jewish nationality. Outside these talks, speaking publicly at some meeting of some society, either in Tel Aviv or in Jerusalem, Israeli Foreign Minister Itzhak Shamir also discovered Israeli property in the Soviet Union. True, he said that this was valuable property, he even said it was a treasure. It seems that the property he had in mind was, as he stated it, two million trapped Jews. Raising the topic, the question in this way is, in general, flagrant interference in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union and totally unjustified posturizing, since the aforementioned two million Soviet citizens of Jewish nationality did not authorize Mr. Shamir to speak on their behalf. I don't think that those two million regard themselves as his property, or even Israeli property. Even a treasure [words indistinct]. Say, tomorrow England will declare that all Americans of English extraction, all the WASPs, [in English] Anglo-Saxon white Protestants, [in Russian] all those WASPs, are the property of the Queen of England. Suppose the day after tomorrow Spain declares that all Argentinians of Spanish extraction, or Uruguayans are the property of the King of Spain. Suppose the day after that Holland would declare that all Afrikaners are also the property of Holland, etc. In general, such a statement of the question is unacceptable to the Soviet side. Israel has no right to speak for Soviet citizens of Jewish nationality. So, at the meeting in Helsinki the issue was, as agreed in advance, a visit of Soviet consular officials to Tel Aviv, including a typist, some technician, etc. That is, the discussion was of technical questions: visas, automobile, typewriters. However, Israel raised the question of a visit to Moscow of an Israeli group with a similar purpose. But the thing is that there is no Israeli property on Soviet territory. And there are no Israeli citizens permanently residing in the Soviet Union. Since no common ground was found on this, the question of a visit of Soviet consular officials to Tel Aviv has been put off.

These are my three statements. Please, any questions.

[Correspondent] [In English] CHICAGO TRIBUNE. During a press conference in this room last Wednesday, Mr. Kapitsa said the decision concerning the moratorium would be partly based on an assessment of how serious Ronald Reagan was about arms control as contained in his recent letter to Mr.

Gorbachev. We've now had an extension of the moratorium. Is it safe to conclude that the Kremlin was pleased by the President's letter? Is it also true that the Kremlin assessment of that proposal will be announced, I ask [words indistinct] on the 15th of July [words indistinct]?

[Gerasimov] [In English] I can't hear you clearly. Maybe put your mike closer.

[Correspondent] [In English] Should I repeat the first part of the question?

[Gerasimov] [In English] No.

[Correspondent] Last Wednesday, at a press conference here, Deputy Foreign Minister Kapitsa said the decision on the moratorium would be partly based on an assessment of President Reagan's letter to General Secretary Gorbachev.

[Gerasimov] I don't recall that he put it that way. As far as I remember, Mikhail Stepanovich Kapitsa said our decision would depend, we would weigh it also against the American attitude to this problem. He made no mention of the letter. He made no mention of the letter. As for how we arrived at this decision, I can again address you back to the statement, because it states the pros and cons, weighing. So if we nevertheless decided to once again appeal to President Reagan to overcome misconceptions about the Soviet Union and to think once again. This is once again an insistent request to the United States to once again reflect on what is best for it and for the world as a whole: whether to senselessly continue this nuclear arms race--the tests are [words indistinct]--or to stop it.

[Correspondent] [In English] I want to ask the second part of the question. I was curious when the Kremlin will make public the assessment of that letter? And I ask this because on the 15th of July, in a press conference here, you criticized the Reagan White House for being tardy in responding to the General Secretary's proposal which was sent to Washington on June 23rd. At the time 22 days had elapsed. It's now been 24 days since the Kremlin has received Mr. Reagan's proposal. I'm curious whether an assessment has been made, and if so, has it been transmitted through diplomatic channels, and when might we possibly expect a public announcement?

[Gerasimov] I recently saw a statement, I think by that same Larry Speakes, that he wasn't prodding the Soviet side and was not expecting a final response, or even simply a reply, from the Soviet side to President Reagan's letter in the very immediate future. That is, they are not hurrying us. So we are, of course, seriously considering the letter. Besides, as you know, currently Soviet-American meetings are taking place on different issues, consultations of experts, which help to clarify certain elements, details and nuances. We don't want to respond just for the sake of responding, we must respond after getting all the necessary information together.

[Correspondent] [In English] Jim Jackson, TIME magazine. I think I understood you to say that there was no agreement in Helsinki on the time for a further visit either of a Soviet delegation to Tel Aviv or of an Israeli

tests. This way the Americans [words indistinct] of world public opinion.  
[End of side 1 of tape]

[Side 2 of tape]

[Gerasimov] [Words indistinct] It's the same old argument about the Soviet military threat in different versions. It seems to me that the figures of the Swedish Defense Institute which I cited, and which show that, judging from arithmetic, we are behind the Americans in respect of nuclear tests. It follows, according to the logic of development of military technology, that we have hardly overtaken the Americans in nuclear weapons themselves, their parameters. Unfortunately the thesis regarding the Soviet military threat is ever present in different variants in American policy to justify the arms race.

In America itself much is written that this is the central thesis. I can, for example, mention the very good book, which I may one day bring and quote from, by Tom (?Cervantes?), director of a New York research institute. It is called THE SOVIET MILITARY SUPERIORITY MYTH. It is a very thoughtful study which demonstrates that virtually in every parameter, or almost in every parameter, it is the United States that has military superiority. Yet the myth persists and is repeated to justify continuation of the arms race. True, I must say that the author holds that, although in certain specific military parameters the Americans enjoy superiority, in our nuclear age this is not of significant military consequence.

[Correspondent] [Words indistinct]. My question refers to your statement on the resumption of talks on consular relations between the USSR and Israel. As is known, Israel wants [words indistinct] relations, even small, with the USSR and other socialist countries so as to get rid to some extent of the wall of isolation in which it has found itself, and for which it has only itself to blame. The first part of my question is, do you think [words indistinct] what [word indistinct] to get rid of this isolation? Second, why is this seen as the time to start talks about some properties in Israel and in the USSR, and is this a suitable time on the eve of the Soviet-American summit?

[Gerasimov] We are not conducting any talks with Israel. Incidentally, we conducted no talks in Helsinki either. It was a preliminary meeting of two consular officials concerning conditions of a trip to Tel Aviv to discuss essentially consular matters. I told you in great detail why that preliminary meeting ended as it did, namely, no continuation is planned.

[Correspondent] [In English] LOS ANGELES TIMES. The speech last night by the general secretary seems to imply that agreement already is reached on the Soviet-American summit. Is that a correct interpretation, or... What is the status of the summit?

[Gerasimov] As you know, the road to the top is a long one. Difficult is the way to the top. And in the present case there are several stages. We are now at the stage of Soviet-American consultations. We had consultations on nuclear tests, we had consultations on [words indistinct]

delegation to Moscow. Was there any agreement on any question at all reached in Helsinki this week?

[Gerasimov] No, as I said, no agreement was reached. Nor was any agreement reached on a subsequent meeting.

[Correspondent] [Words indistinct] ending nuclear tests can be achieved quickly and signed already this year at a Soviet-American summit. You already mentioned this. But the question is, how can such an agreement be [words indistinct]? Is the Soviet Union also ready to conclude [words indistinct]?

[Gerasimov] As I see it, the problem of ending nuclear weapons tests is essentially a political one. I recall that in 1963, when the Moscow partial nuclear test ban treaty was signed, it took several weeks for it to be signed, and the then head of the American delegation, Averill Harriman, said that it was all a question of desire. When both sides wanted to conclude the agreement, it did not take much effort to come to terms. I think that this statement of his is fully applicable to the current situation. The technical problems of verification have been resolved. If there is the desire it is not so hard to come to terms on verification, and indeed, the diplomats could, therefore, come to terms very quickly, provided they receive the necessary instructions. Unfortunately, only one side has the appropriate instructions. As for the form, the form [words indistinct] agreement [words indistinct], I think that this is of no fundamental significance. We still have not come to terms with the Americans in principal that it is necessary to ban nuclear tests. They make reference to such a ban as some remote goal, but they set such conditions which postpone those goals till the Greek calends. They say that it is necessary that there should be [words indistinct] deterrent. That is, they in effect demand nuclear disarmament first. They are putting the cart before the horse, saying that when nuclear deterrence is done away with, when there is a balance of conventional forces, and a number of other reasons, then, they say, will be the time to ban tests. In my view, this is putting the cart before the horse. Actually, we should start with ending tests. Then it would be better to settle other issues.

[Correspondent] [Words indistinct]. As is known, a few days ago [words indistinct] an interview with American President Reagan, who, speaking of his response to Mikhail Gorbachev's proposal, said that his answer was in a constructive spirit. But today we hear that White House spokesman Larry Speakes responded to Mikhail Gorbachev's yesterday's statement, that no reasonable person, still less a responsible government representative, can reject, responded in a not very constructive spirit. How does Moscow assess the American so-called constructive spirit?

[Gerasimov] So far we see nothing constructive. For example, this first initial reaction to the extension of the Soviet moratorium. It is, of course, disappointing. [Words indistinct]. I mentioned American statements, notably the statement in TIME, that the Soviet Union is planning to resume tests. We were being literally pulled by our coattails, we were literally invited to resume tests. Of course, the American military would feel themselves more comfortable if they could say, look, they too are conducting



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nuclear space weapons. I have mentioned many of them here at various briefings. Consultations on measures to prevent the accidental outbreak of nuclear war, and so on. This is the stage we are at now. After this stage there will be another stage, the stage of meetings between the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and the US Secretary of State on 19-20 September in Washington. That, so far, is how the way to the top looks, the way to the summit, the meeting at the summit. Well, but beyond that, you can see what the weather is like, foggy [words indistinct].

[Correspondent] [Words indistinct]

[Gerasimov] If it has flown out [words indistinct] flown out, then it has remained, but it has already stopped talks.

[Correspondent] [In English] NBC NEWS. Back on the subject of the summit talks and the agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union to stop nuclear testing. Mr. Gorbachev's word in assessing that was confidence that such an agreement would be reached. Can you give us a basis for that confidence, particularly inasmuch as the US response has been so negative? And second, can you tell us if that confidence is based on what the US has been saying privately rather than publicly?

[Gerasimov] [Words indistinct] Here you probably have this in mind. [Reads] The Soviet Union is confident that an agreement on ending tests can be achieved quickly and signed this year at a Soviet-American summit meeting.

I have already explained a little why he is confident. There are no problems here. If only the desire were there. But on the American side it is lacking. So we are expressing confidence that it could be possible to sign this desire... sign this agreement. But unfortunately, as President Reagan says, it takes two to dance the tango. In this case, too...

[Correspondent] [In English] [Words indistinct] Last week, speaking in this room on the Israeli-USSR talks in Helsinki, it was stated that in case of the opening of consular offices, this would be done on the base of reciprocity. If I have correctly understood from what you've said now, there is no reason for an Israeli office in Moscow, because there are no Israeli properties, no Israeli citizens. So does it imply that the reciprocity is not any more valid?

[Gerasimov] We are not speaking of the establishment of consular relations at this time. We are not speaking on this. In general, it's time to close this question. It's Israel who is opening it, [words indistinct] they are using it for their political purposes. I can only repeat that there was a preliminary meeting in Helsinki and nothing was achieved there. It had been intended that this preliminary meeting would lead to a talk on substance on these consular questions. But it ended in nothing. So even that talk will not take place. Well, it can't be helped, we'll wait some more. [Words indistinct] all these questions arise because for some reason the impression is created... I am telling you that this is only a consular question, but you keep considering that it isn't only a consular question. For some reason the impression is created that some kind of game is being played [words

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indistinct]. It's nothing of the sort, and there was nothing from the very beginning. And there will not be, because we denounce Israel for its aggressive policies and are prepared to restore diplomatic relations only if Israel ceases its aggression against the Arab countries.

Are there any more questions?

[Correspondent] PRENSA LATINA agency. Lately the American press has been writing a lot that the Soviet Union has the intention to join the International Monetary Fund. What can you say about this?

[Gerasimov] I haven't seen these reports. I'm a poor economist and I can't answer the question at this time. Are there any more questions? No more questions? Good-bye.

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PETROVSKIY, DEPUTIES DISCUSS UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY SESSION

Moscow MFA Press Briefing in Russian 11 Sep 86

[The following is the text of a press conference by Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir F. Petrovskiy and Foreign Ministry officials Valentin Lozinskiy, Vsevolod L. Oleandrov, and Gleb A. Smirnov, held at the Moscow Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Center on 11 September 1986. The briefing was chaired by Gennadiy Gerasimov and conducted in Russian except where noted]

[Text] [Gerasimov] ...of the UN General Assembly. The delegation is headed by Comrade Shevardnadze, member of the Politburo of the CC CPSU, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Today, here to meet with you and discuss questions connected with the forthcoming General Assembly session are deputy head of the Soviet delegation, Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Fedorovich Petrovskiy and deputy members of the Soviet delegation, leading Foreign Ministry officials Valentin Vladimovich Lozinskiy, Vsevolod Leonidovich Oleandrov, and Gleb Aleksandrovich Smirnov. The opening statement will be made by Vladimir Fedorovich Petrovskiy.

[Petrovskiy] Esteemed ladies and gentlemen, comrades. The 41st session of the UN General Assembly, the world's most representative assembly of nations, is opening September 16 in New York. The Soviet Union is coming to this session with a comprehensive program of practical actions aimed at eliminating the nuclear threat, ending the arms race, and preserving and strengthening universal peace. Guided by the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress, our country offers the world community new ideas and fresh approaches aimed at building a guaranteed peaceful future for all our planet's peoples, a future without wars or violence. We consider it extremely important that both the debates and decisions of the 41st General Assembly session which, as you know, coincides with the final stage of the International Year of Peace, be marked by a new political mentality in keeping with the requirements of the nuclear-space era. An expression of such a new mentality is the proposal for the creation of an all-encompassing international security system which, as is known, a group of socialist countries, including the Soviet Union, submitted in advance for the consideration of the forthcoming session. This joint initiative is a generalized embodiment of the socialist states' coordinated foreign policy line, their contribution to the formulation of a global philosophy and program for creating a safe world as opposed to the current global threat to humanity. Implementation of this initiative would promote an essentially revolutionary reshaping of the political consciousness and

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behavior of nations. This initiative is designed to put a resolute end to the policy of confrontation and the arms race and pool the efforts of all nations with the purpose of establishing a world system which would not simply be characterized by the absence of wars but would eliminate the threat of their ever being started, reliably guaranteeing equal security conditions for all in all spheres of international relations.

Convincing testimony to the Soviet Union's bold new approach to international affairs is the moratorium on all nuclear explosions. Being not just a declaration but an act, the moratorium has already become an inalienable political and military fact of life in the modern world. The moratorium has special significance in the context of the United Nations' activities. For almost 30 years the General Assembly has been insistently calling for an end to, and ban on, nuclear tests. The actions of the American side, which has responded to the silence of Soviet nuclear test ranges with 19 nuclear explosions, is directly contrary to this will of the world community. We consider that by its collective authority the United Nations can and should help transform renunciation of nuclear tests from a political slogan to a fact of life. A statement by the nonaligned movement adopted a few days ago in Harare justly says with regard to ending tests that the peoples of the world would hail such a move, which would be a major contribution to the cause of reducing the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation and promote progress in other spheres of disarmament.

The Soviet Union would like the forthcoming General Assembly session to give impetus to progress in the nuclear, chemical and all other spheres of arms limitation and disarmament, with strict verification, including, when necessary, on-site verification.

I would also like to emphasize that we see disarmament not as an end in itself. We would like the funds made available in the disarmament process to be channelled solely to creative purposes, including help to developing countries. We also propose specific peaceful alternatives to military programs: the peaceful use of space, nuclear energy and chemistry.

In the political field, the Assembly could, in our view, help assure strict observance of the right of every nation to the independent determination of its own destiny, it could help to unravel conflict and crisis situations in all areas of the world without exception and to prevent and eradicate terrorism in all its forms and manifestations.

A security system is also impossible without practical efforts aimed at restructuring international economic relations and developing world cooperation in the humanitarian field. Our approach to this is oriented entirely on an honest, constructive, responsible dialogue, on a joint search for answers to burning issues in the interests of universal security, trust and international cooperation.

The Soviet Union is resolved to do its best in our complex, contradictory, but at the same time interdependent world to make the United Nations, as envisioned in its Charter, an important tool of such joint search, to make it a genuine center for coordinating the actions of all nations. Thank you.

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[Gerasimov] Thank you, Vladimir Fedorovich. Please, now questions.

[Correspondent] Polish television. Polish Radio and Television. At the 40th session of the UN General Assembly, on the initiative of the Soviet Union [words indistinct] international cooperation in the peaceful use and exploration of outer space, there is a unilateral moratorium in effect [words indistinct] the creation of an international system of verification of the non-conducting of nuclear tests is proposed. What can be said at this time in detail about the next stage of the Soviet Union's peaceful offensive at the 41st UN session?

[Petrovskiy] The Soviet Union intends to launch an extensive peaceful offensive at this session. For this we are equipped with both a new political philosophy of survival and a platform of concrete actions. This platform of concrete actions embraces virtually all spheres of international relations: political, military, economic, humanitarian. The essence of this platform is that the time has come to proceed from words and declarations to concrete, really tangible deeds. Our repeatedly extended unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests is an example of this approach--as I have already said, not a declaration but an act. We are prepared to act in other areas associated with the strengthening of universal security. It is extremely important for the General Assembly, this unique and universal forum which expresses the interests of the entire world community, to create an appropriate, I would say, international political environment which would favor the finding of solutions to all, and I emphasize all, questions arising in international affairs. For this it is necessary to completely abandon efforts to use this forum for confrontation and get down to coordinating actions in all spheres, to working out common positions.

[Correspondent] [Words indistinct] Could you please tell us how the Soviet proposals for establishing a comprehensive international security system correlate to the collective security system provided for in the UN Charter?

[Unidentified Russian speaker] We have stated that the United Nations Organization is called upon to play an important, one could say key role in the creation of a comprehensive international security system, as seen by the Soviet Union and the other co-sponsors of the proposal submitted for the General Assembly's consideration. Of course, we see that to date the United Nations' potential and the collective security system envisioned in its Charter have not been actively put into effect. This was at times prevented by the positions of individual states. Our idea is that in future, when refining and developing a comprehensive system, all multilateral diplomatic mechanisms which exist or may in future be developed will be involved in this system. Naturally, the United Nations, as a universal forum and as an organization which envisages the possibility of taking specific actions to ensure peace and international security, will play an active role and help to achieve the goals of strengthening international security in all the different areas which this system is designed to encompass.

[Correspondent] This is not the first time that the question of creating a comprehensive collective international security system has been raised. To what, this time, is this system tied?

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[Petrovskiy] I think that this is a correct and fair formulation of the question. The thing is that this time the question of creating a universal security system has been posed as applied to the new international political environment which, as you know, is characterized by the realities of the nuclear-space era. In these circumstances the novelty of raising the question of creating a universal international security system in that it assumes the renunciation of the dangerous and, I would say, in our time fatal for all mankind misconception that one's own security can be strengthened to the detriment of other nations through the arms race and development of state-of-the-art weapons. Today, in the nuclear-space age, the arms race leads essentially to zero security, that is literally to the self-destruction of mankind. In our nuclear-space age real security cannot be assured by military superiority. It can only be universal and equal. Neither, in our time, does the problem of ensuring security lend itself to military-technical solutions. This is a past page of history. That is why the socialist countries' proposal transfers the question to another plane, it shifts the center of gravity to the solution of security questions by political means. The novelty of the proposal also consists in that the problem of assuring universal security now presumes a multi-dimensional, integrated approach. In today's interdependent world this problem can no longer be restricted to the framework of political and military sphere. Genuine security can be assured only by overcoming mistrust, the threat or use of force in all spheres of international security, in all spheres of international relations. The comprehensive problem of security... a comprehensive security system should, therefore, include, along with the military and political, also the economic and humanitarian spheres. That is why the socialist countries have now submitted to the UN such a wide-scale action program designed for the long-term perspective. They proceed from the idea that it would be possible to discuss this problem at this General Assembly session in all its diversity, in all its aspects, so as to then draft a basic document which would reaffirm and complement the United Nations Charter and give concrete expression to its provisions, taking into account the current realities of the nuclear-space age.

[Correspondent] [Words indistinct] During your visit, will there be a meeting between Shevardnadze and Shultz, as [words indistinct]? The second question: The Soviet Union has stated that the arrest of Mr. Danilooff should not affect relations between the Soviet Union and the USA. What measures is the Soviet Union prepared to take to avoid a negative impact?

[Petrovskiy] I must answer the first question first. The Soviet Union proceeds from the consideration that the event planned for September 19 and 20 should take place at the stated time. In our view, there are no obstacles to such a meeting. As for the Danilooff case, it was already said here, that our position is that we are not making Soviet-American relations hostage to such a case. [Words indistinct] the question of the Danilooff case. In this connection I would like to tell the correspondents present here that the American side--the American side, those who well know--know quite well that Danilooff has been charged on legitimate grounds. This is confirmed by evidence and materials. I would also like to stress that the possibility of settling this undoubtedly exists. Such incidents in relations between states, Soviet-American relations in particular, should not prevent the development of

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these relations. As for the Soviet side, I must say that we are doing everything possible for this, and I can say that we are in contact with the appropriate authorized American organizations, and now everything depends on the American side. But please understand that I would not like to go into details, since this would fan the already artificially inflamed hullabaloo over the Daniloff case.

[Correspondent] NOVOSTI PRESS AGENCY, Arsenyev. Vladimir Fedorovich, you mentioned peaceful alternatives to military programs. Could you speak of this more specifically?

[Petrovskiy] I have already mentioned in my statement that we do not regard disarmament as an end in itself. To us disarmament is first and foremost a means of precluding the possibility of material preparation for war and creating peaceful conditions for the life of our people and the life of the peoples of the whole planet. In particular, we proceed from the consideration that the disarmament process should be accompanied by making the funds saved in the process available for development. In this connection, we consider that in all spheres where the arms race exists and military programs are implemented there exist corresponding peaceful alternatives. Take, for example, outer space. The Americans are now striving in every way to transfer the arms race to outer space, and through this to actually draw the world into a new, much more dangerous spiral of the arms race. We, for our part, put forward as an alternative to Star Wars another alternative, an alternative of peaceful use of space, and this alternative is not just words. It is a concrete program designed to cover three stages. You know that it was set forth in our message to UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar, and this program provides for a three-stage development of the peaceful exploration of outer space as a result of which it would be possible to carry out integrated investigation of space technology for global studies of the biosphere, the use of other achievements of space technology for the good of all mankind, for help to the developing nations.

As a first stage we would consider it possible to convene an international conference in the early 1990s. It would examine all aspects of this action program for the peaceful use of outer space and set up a world space agency to coordinate the actions of other states. I took the peaceful use of space as an example of an alternative, but I must say that similar alternatives also exist in the nuclear area, in the chemical area. In other words, we consider that disarmament programs should be immediately supplemented with programs of peaceful utilization of those branches which are rid of the burdensome arms race.

[Correspondent] [In English] Mr. Petrovskiy, you mentioned that the American side knows that the case of Daniloff is legitimate, yet we have the American President himself in a private communication to your head of state and in a public comment just two days ago asserting that Mr. Daniloff was not a spy and has never been one. Doesn't this lead to direct confrontation between your two governments which is already crippling many negotiations needlessly?

[Unidentified Russian speaker] [words indistinct] I prepared for this question. [Laughter]. It says here, true, in English. [Reads in English]

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"I don't want to rock the boat. It isn't safe to comment on it." [In Russian] I have quoted President Reagan.

[Petrovskiy] I have little to add after this.

[Correspondent] [Words indistinct] As is known, [words indistinct] a number of leaders of Arab countries visited the Soviet Union. Also, recently Mr. Petrovskiy visited a number of Arab countries. How do the Arab leaders of those countries react to the Soviet Union's initiative, insofar as Tel Aviv's nuclear bomb also threatens their security?

[Petrovskiy] Indeed, at the end of August our first deputy minister, Comrade Vorontsov, and I visited a number of Arab countries. We had consultations with the leaders of those countries and the leaders of the foreign affairs agencies on a wide range of international problems. I must say that the general impression I gained from my meetings was that the countries I visited are very concerned with the deterioration of the international situation. Naturally, they are also concerned with the growing nuclear threat, moreover in their own region. This threat was repeatedly put on record in United Nations resolutions, which pointed out the danger of Israeli and South African nuclear plans. It is precisely in the realization of this threat that the Arab countries completely share the view that resolute actions are needed, and not just resolute, I would say immediate actions to remove the nuclear threat. I think their voting record in the United Nations on these most important questions offers a good characterization of their approach. But the main idea of the consultations we had in the Arab East was to exchange views on questions of a Middle East settlement. We can't help being concerned with the chronic tensions in that region, chronic tensions which threaten to flare up at any moment. These are smoldering embers in the Middle East. I must say in this connection, based on our general basic policy of settling conflict and crisis situations, we discussed the question of how to put the question of a comprehensive Mideast settlement in the practical plane. I must say that the Arab countries are generally supportive of the idea which originated in Moscow during the Soviet-French meeting, to start a preparatory process... [End of side 1 of tape]

[Side 2 of tape]

[Correspondent] ...At the time there was talk of whether it wouldn't be useful to transfer the UN headquarters to another country. Is there anything new on this score?

[Unidentified Russian speaker] Indeed, lately the American side, the country which offered to host the United Nations, has been stepping up actions which cannot be regarded otherwise than as creating conditions unfavorable to the functioning of this organization and to the activities of the member-states represented in the UN headquarters. This, in particular, pertains to the US authorities' requirement, totally unfounded from the point of view of existing international procedure, to set a limit on the number of employees of the Soviet mission and a number of other missions to the UN. Naturally, the members of this organization are not responsible to the American government, but operate in accordance with their requirements arising in

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connection with the functioning of numerous UN agencies. Regretfully, of late there have been no noticeable indications that the American side has revised its position, revised its intention to dictate to other nations how they should act in the United Nations Organization. Of course, these and other facts do not create conditions conducive to the organization's successful functioning. However, the question naturally arising in the minds of many--whether it would not be better to look for other, more favorable conditions in other countries where this organization functions--this is a complex question. It is also associated with numerous political and financial factors which, of course, require a more thorough study. It seems to us that a simpler way out of this situation would be the adoption by the US authorities of a stance which would be conducive to the normal functioning of the organization. In any case, this clearly suggests itself at present.

[Correspondent] [In English] WASHINGTON POST. I have two questions to Mr. Petrovskiy. One is regarding his recent trip to the Middle East. In the context of talks about the possibilities for an international conference, did the Soviet Union's recent meeting with Israel in Helsinki come up, and if so, what was the assessment of the Arab interlocutors to that meeting? And the second question is a different one. Recently the Soviet Union made a proposal, or let's say called for international cooperation in combating terrorism. I was wondering if in the context of the United Nations session there were plans to follow up this proposal with concrete steps.

[Petrovskiy] The contacts with the representatives of the Israeli foreign office which took place in Helsinki had no relation at all to a Middle East settlement or to Middle East affairs. Those contacts were linked with a settlement of a number of questions pertaining to Soviet real estate in Israel--I can tell you that there are some 20 sites which belong to the government and to the Russian church mission--and also with a settlement of questions regarding Soviet citizens in Israel who are on the territory of that country. These were purely consular contacts on a fairly low technical level, it was customary consular work with no bearing at all on questions associated with a Middle East settlement.

The second question, with regard to terrorism. With regard to terrorism I can say that we made a proposal from the rostrum of the 27th congress to deal with international terrorism in all its forms and manifestations seriously and directly on an international collective basis. You know what reaction we got to this proposal. Less than a month after this proposal of ours the United States committed an act of state terrorism against Libya. Now, guided by the concept which I spoke of at the very beginning, that all problems should be resolved by political means, we propose to approach questions of international terrorism in all its forms and manifestations with this yardstick. In particular, incidentally, there now arises the serious problem of combating nuclear terrorism. This is a very serious thing which deserves the attention of international organizations. We are ready to cooperate very seriously with all countries which strive for this.

[Correspondent] How does the development of a universal security system correlate with regional security systems?

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[Petrovskiy] I don't want to monopolize the discussion, and I will ask our specialist on these problems, Vsevolod Leonidovich Oleandrov, to answer these questions.

[Oleandrov] I must say that the regional aspect of security and the global aspect of security do not contradict one another. On the contrary, they mutually complement each other, they interact and strengthen each other. In our time it has become an inalienable truth that a small conflict, a local conflict is fraught with the threat of escalating into wider conflicts and even into a global confrontation. That is why the Soviet Union advocates the creation of regional security systems as an organic part of a universal, worldwide international security system. A good example in this respect is the Final Act of the Helsinki European Conference. This document has survived many difficulties in international relations, and it is a good lesson in civilized communication between states in our very complex nuclear-missile age. The experience of the Helsinki Conference, the Helsinki process can be very useful in the formation, the creation of a comprehensive international security system.

Speaking not long ago in Vladivostok, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev suggested including the Asian-Pacific Ocean region in the process of creating a comprehensive security system. It was also stated that the European experience could be very useful in this respect. We are convinced that the implementation of plans of creating security, a regional security system in the Asian-Pacific Ocean region and a continuation of the development of the process in Europe, Africa and Latin America in many ways promotes the creation of a universal system of international security.

[Correspondent] [In English] A question from ABC. There's been a great deal of reaction from the United States with regard to the Daniloff case, but we haven't heard anything from the Soviet Union yet with regard to the UN employee, the Soviet citizen, Mr. Zakharov, who was arrested, detained and was indicted this week. The first question is, do you have any reaction to that action taken against a Soviet citizen in the United States? And secondly, I'm wondering if the rather low-key responses to the Daniloff case here this morning are to be taken to mean that perhaps talks on both cases are at a climactic or deeply important point?

[Petrovskiy] I would like to answer your question as follows. Here once again [words indistinct] the Daniloff case is in no way linked with the Zakharov case. This is a different, entirely independent case. I would also like to emphasize that we consider that a settlement of these cases is possible. I would like to restrict myself to this response.

[Correspondent] [Words indistinct] I would like to hear your assessment of the international reaction to the latest [words indistinct] of Gorbachev [words indistinct].

[Petrovskiy] Already today, although not much time has passed since Mikhail Sergeyevich's statement, but already today one can say with full justification that Mikhail Sergeyevich's statement on questions associated with the Soviet nuclear explosions moratorium has had widespread international repercussions.

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I think that the reaction to our statement on this score currently gives grounds to speak of a kind of test of the moratorium, a test of the maturity, the political maturity of states. To paraphrase a well-known Russian aphorism, I think one could say, "Tell me your attitude to the moratorium and I will say who you are, a friend or foe of the cause of peace." In this connection extremely characteristic is [words indistinct] which is now appearing in international affairs, namely, that the watershed in attitudes towards the Soviet moratorium passes not along political, ideological or social boundaries. The watershed lies, rather, between those who hold positions of common sense and political realism and those who are guided by force considerations, who count on force as the last resort in world affairs. I think that, nevertheless, there are grounds to count on common sense ultimately tipping the balance and as a result of this universal support of the idea of ending tests, a nuclear-free age will finally draw closer.

[Correspondent] [Words indistinct] I would like to get back to the General Assembly session. You just said that the moratorium is a kind of touchstone for testing the statesmanship of the leaders of nuclear powers. In this connection, do you foresee that the question of ending nuclear tests will be raised at this General Assembly session independently, not within a comprehensive program [words indistinct]? And secondly, it is known from reports that by the beginning of July the United States had failed to contribute 240 millions as its payment, and after 1 October it intends to reduce its annual contribution to the United Nations. How are these gestures regarded?

[Petrovskiy] On the first question, I can answer that the question of banning nuclear weapons tests is already on the UN agenda and it has been debated for almost 30 years in the United Nations. I must say that UN resolutions on this question have been passed by overwhelming majorities. The last time, I think, only the US, Britain and France were against these resolutions. I think that by virtue of the great importance which the question of ending nuclear weapons tests has now acquired--actually it's now becoming quite obvious that this is the simplest solution in the sphere of limiting the arms race in both the political and technical aspects--one can probably expect that the question of banning nuclear weapons will occupy a prominent place at this General Assembly session. All the more so as recent international forums, meetings of the socialist countries, conferences of the non-aligned movement have shown that all countries consider that a breakthrough can be achieved in this matter, that the banning of tests could become a prologue to limiting and ending the arms race in the nuclear and, in fact, in all other areas.

On the second question I... [Words indistinct]

[Unidentified Russian speaker] Yes, lately financial difficulties are frequently mentioned in connection with the UN, in particular, the absence of available funds in the UN treasury, which is due to delays in dues payments, by the United States in the first place, which under the scale drawn up by the appropriate UN committee should, in accordance with its payment capabilities, contribute 25 percent. Of course, such actions, which create not only financial but also political pressure on the United Nations, are impermissible, and very many countries, including, as is known, US allies,

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West European countries, have protested the US intentions to arbitrarily set its contribution and pay less into the UN budget. However, the Soviet Union, for its part, strives to give the greatest help to the United Nations in its financial straits, and to this end it is carrying out its obligations for timely payment of its dues for the current year--the Soviet Union has already fully paid its contribution--and is taking additional steps to alleviate the organization's fiscal problems.

[Correspondent] [Words indistinct] What proposals associated with the question of security measures [words indistinct] will the Soviet delegation submit to the current UN session? The second question: Recently the Japanese government officially announced that it would take part in the star wars program. [Words indistinct] how the Soviet side will respond?

[Petrovskiy] Well, on the first question. We regard the question of creating a secure peace system in the Asian-Pacific Ocean region as part, a component part of the general problem of establishing a universal international security system. In promoting the idea of establishing an international security system we proceed from the consideration that regional measures should also be undertaken along these lines. The Asian-Pacific Ocean region is one of the most important areas, but we also favor the establishment of appropriate regional security systems in other regions. A good example of this is Europe, where the all-European process begun in Helsinki has withstood the test of time and continues to yield real, effective, positive fruit for the peoples of that continent. These are the ideas with which we approach the problem.

We consider that the Strategic Defense Initiative plans are in effect star wars plans. You know the essence of those plans very well--that of creating [sozdat] a space shield in, I would say, a futile attempt to carry out a nuclear first strike with impunity. Accession of various countries, in particular Japan, in no way promotes the interests of peace, the interests of disarmament, since the SDI program threatens to drag us not only into an arms race, which in this case would acquire uncontrollable features, but it also threatens to increase the threat of nuclear war.

[Unidentified Russian speaker] There is the scary story of the villain who plays a pipe and leads children away. It is very strange that Japan is acting like such a child and following America to the edge of the precipice.

[Correspondent] [Words indistinct] Lately much is being said of the need to build confidence among states. What do you see as the main ways to achieve this?

[Petrovskiy] I think this is a very good question, a question which currently really concerns virtually everyone. The question of confidence-building arises wherever you go, at government meetings as well as at public forums. This is a very serious and important question. How to achieve, how to build confidence? I think that the only way to build confidence is through practical, tangible actions. That is precisely what guided us when we undertook, despite very definite losses in both the military and political respects, to extend our unilateral moratorium. This is a very real, practical action which promotes confidence, which shows the intentions of states.

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Another way is through a constructive approach to those ideas and proposals which are put forth with the purpose of strengthening universal security, with the purpose of disarmament. There are very many ideas and proposals on the negotiating table and the table of international forums. If we want confidence we must not simply study those proposals but use them as a basis to seek joint solutions, to resolve the issues in practice. I think the socialist countries offer a very good example in this respect. For example, at international forums Bulgaria, which you represent, continuously seeks to raise the issue of limiting the actions of navies and reducing naval armaments. If other countries having navies responded positively to this initiative and would start not just talk but [words indistinct] concrete actions, I think confidence would increase considerably. In other words, in this case the only cure for restoring confidence which I can see is practical actions. We need actions. The time of words has passed and the time factor, which has now become noticeable in international relations, requires [words indistinct].

[Correspondent] [In English] A question from CBS to Mr. Petrovskiy. Would you outline for us the Soviet objectives for the Shultz-Shevardnadze summit? I am especially interested in whether or not the Soviet side expects, not just hopes but expects the two foreign ministers to negotiate some progress towards an arms control agreement more than the--or superior to--the working level talks with what appears to be a lack of progress at the working level talks?

[Petrovskiy] [Words indistinct] I must say great importance to the forthcoming meeting of Comrade Shevardnadze and Mr. Shultz. We know that such meetings are important in the sense that they not only so to say review the state of affairs, but they also outline prospects for the future. That is why, I stress, the meeting is of great importance. You mentioned preceding meetings of experts. Indeed, lately we have had a series of meetings of experts. We consider that those meetings were useful. We have checked, I would say, how our political clocks are running in all areas. In some ways we tried to clean the clockworks, but I must say that we have not achieved a synchronization of our clocks.

[Correspondent] [In English] Italian newspapers are reporting that Mr. Gorbachev plans to go to Rome on October 10th. Can you confirm this?

[Petrovskiy] I must say that the question of Comrade Gorbachev's visit to Italy is a question which is on the agenda.

[Correspondent] [Words indistinct] APN. The Soviet leader's responses to questions of the editor-in-chief of the newspaper [name indistinct] contain a high appreciation of the socialist countries' coordinated foreign policy. Vladimir Fedorovich, could you say a few words about the mechanism and effectiveness of joint socialist diplomacy as reflected in [words indistinct] of the United Nations?

[Petrovskiy] I must say that relations between the socialist countries have long been characterized by definite mechanisms of cooperation, interaction, coordination of positions on different questions. Following the 27th CPSU Congress and the congresses of fraternal Communist Parties, the mechanism of

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this cooperation has been raised, I would say, to a qualitatively new level. These consultations have become even closer and deeper. In particular, in preparation for UN General Assembly sessions there is in existence a system of consultations, initially at the level of the chiefs of international organizations departments, then at the level of deputy foreign ministers responsible for the respective issues. This year is also qualitatively new from the point of view of the socialist countries' approach to the United Nations. For the first time in UN history the socialist countries have come forth with a joint, large-scale political proposal. The proposal to establish a universal security system was drawn up by the socialist countries' joint efforts. It takes into account the proposals and ideas of different members of our community. But it is characteristic that, while setting forth their proposal the socialist countries at the same time take into account everything realistic, everything corresponding.[end of tape]

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